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ABSTRACT 
This Article outlines the different policy alternatives that could 
guide antitrust enforcement in developing countries. These include effi-
ciency-based goals (allocative, productive, economic, and dynamic effi-
ciency) and non-efficiency-based goals (protecting small businesses; 
achieving international competitiveness; eradicating poverty; and pro-
moting fairness, equality, and justice). The actual antitrust goals selected 
by fifty developing countries are then presented. Finally, a proposal is 
made with regards to what developing countries should aim at achieving 
with their antitrust law enforcement. This normative take is geared to-
wards realizing dynamic efficiencies or technological progress, coupled 
with redistribution through antitrust rules, as the accelerators of growth 
and development. Promoting growth through innovation, as an antitrust 
objective, corresponds to a desire to incorporate antitrust policy within a 
broader development agenda that is more suitable to developing coun-
tries than static efficiency-based goals. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is futile to argue whether developing countries should or should 
not adopt competition laws. The reality is that, despite adopting them due 
to Western and international pressure in many instances, most develop-
ing countries currently have competition laws and an enforcing authority 
in place.1 Many scholars have focused their analyses on the kind of laws 
developing countries should adopt.2 The argument repeatedly made is 
that developing countries need competition laws adapted to their eco-
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 1. For a detailed analysis of why developing countries adopt antitrust laws, see Dina Waked, 
Competition Law in the Developing World: The Why and How of Adoption and Its Implications for 
International Competition Law, 1 GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 69 (2008). 
 2. See id. 
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nomic, social, and political backgrounds, and they should not cut and 
paste laws developed elsewhere.3 However, many developing countries 
adopt competition laws identical to those established in more advanced 
countries.4 This renders focusing on the need for specifically tailored 
laws for developing countries rather pointless. What is worth consider-
ing, and what has been addressed in recent literature, is what developing 
countries should pick as their policy orientation to guide their enforce-
ment strategies. 
Contrary to expectations, previous research has shown that devel-
oping countries do enforce their antitrust laws.5 From this respect, an 
analysis of the policies that guide their enforcement process and those 
that should guide their enforcement is worthwhile. So far, we only know 
that most developing countries do enforce their antitrust laws and that 
their enforcement varies given their developmental, ideological, interna-
tional, political, and institutional frameworks.6 Yet, we do not know what 
they aim at achieving when they enforce these laws. This Article first 
discusses different goals of competition law enforcement. It also discuss-
es what goals developing countries actually choose to guide their en-
forcement activity. The discussion ends with a normative assessment on 
what the guiding policy for developing countries’ antitrust enforcement 
should be. This normative stance places antitrust as a tool in a broader 
developmental agenda for developing countries to pursue, with the pur-
pose of enforcement being the realization of growth through dynamic 
efficiencies or technological progress, coupled with redistribution. Dy-
namic efficiency, as used by Alice Amsden and Ajit Singh, is used here 
to refer to the maximizing of the long-term rate of growth of industrial 
and overall productivity.7 
Antitrust laws can be used as tools to achieve predetermined social 
and economic outcomes. Developing countries, therefore, have a choice 
to make as to the normative baseline that drives their competition policy 
and enforcement process. Their “objectives can shape enforcement poli-
cy and priorities. [These objectives] can alert policymakers to any gaps 
between actual and desired outcomes from current enforcement. They 
                                                
 3. See, e.g., Michal S. Gal, The “Cut and Paste” of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Con-
ditions for a Successful Transplant, 9 EUR. J. L. REFORM 467 (2007). 
 4. See Waked, supra note 1. 
 5. See Dina I. Waked, Do Developing Countries Enforce Their Antitrust Laws? A Statistical 
Study of Public Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries (Dec. 22, 2011) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044047. 
 6. Dina Waked, Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis of the Rea-
sons and Effects of Enforcement and Non-Enforcement (2012) (unpublished SJD Dissertation, Har-
vard Law School) (held by author, available upon request). 
 7. Alice H. Amsden & Ajit Singh, The Optimal Degree of Competition and Dynamic Efficiency 
in Japan and Korea, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 941, 941 (1994). 
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can assist the courts in applying antitrust legal standards to assure that 
the result is aligned with the objectives.”8 
The frequently used quotation from Robert Bork’s Antitrust Para-
dox captures the importance of finding the desirable objectives: 
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a 
firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law—what are 
its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give. . . . On-
ly when the issue of goals has been settled is it possible to frame a 
coherent body of substantive rules.9 
This is particularly relevant for developing countries that are still shaping 
their antitrust legacy and do not have decades of antitrust jurisprudence 
to fall back on and try to make sense of. 
To answer the question of “what the point of the law is,” develop-
ing countries must assess their own needs and tailor their competition 
law enforcement in a way that particularly addresses what they consider 
important, be it development, growth, redistribution, or even poverty 
eradication. 
The selected goal should guide the enforcement process to identify-
ing the ideal market structure that allows realizing such a goal. This en-
tails a two-step process. The first step results in identifying the overall 
goal of antitrust enforcement, which is often in conjunction with the 
overall policy orientation of a country. The second step is identifying the 
market structure that is responsible for accomplishing such a goal. For 
example, if the goal is lower prices as part of a distributive agenda to 
protect consumers, regardless of other outcomes, then antitrust policy 
should target a market structure based on increasing intensity of competi-
tion that leads to the realization of lower prices. This choice is straight-
forward, in the sense that economists agree that lower prices are achieved 
when the intensity of competition increases, which, in the hypothetical 
ideal of perfect competition, leads to firms pricing at marginal cost of 
production.10 
On the other hand, it might be more difficult to predetermine the 
accompanying market structure to achieve other goals. For example, if 
the goal of antitrust is dynamic efficiency captured in higher rates of in-
novation, then two conflicting market structure alternatives are advocat-
ed in the empirical and theoretical literature. On the one hand, it is ar-
gued that more competition leads to higher rates of innovation.11 Where-
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 10. EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 4–6 
(2d ed. 2011). 
 11. See, e.g., infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
948 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:945 
as, on the other hand, it is argued that more concentrated markets will 
allow firms to reinvest their monopoly profits in innovation.12 When such 
conflicts exist, the task of choosing a guiding principle becomes more 
daunting, as one cannot have a straightforward answer as to which mar-
ket structure to encourage. 
However, before assessing the market structure that needs to ac-
company the chosen policy framework, developing countries first have to 
choose between a wide array of alternative, often conflicting, polices or 
goals that can guide their antitrust enforcement process. Picking a goal is 
“not merely a product of economic theorizing, but of political econo-
my.”13 Evidently, it is also a political choice that countries need to make. 
Support for such choice being a political one can clearly be seen in the 
history of American antitrust policy, where the direction of the enforce-
ment radically changes depending on the administration in office.14 It is 
also “not a once-and-for-all-time decision, but rather reflects a temporary 
consensus that is likely to morph over time to accord with changing po-
litical and economic realities, advancing knowledge, and general fash-
ions in political and economic thought.”15 
The intellectual debate in the West, as to the goals of antitrust, is 
neither novel nor settled. It spans from before the adoption of the Sher-
man Act in 1890 (given this Act is one of the oldest in the advanced 
West) to today.16 This is not only a phenomenon in the U.S., but also a 
debated topic in Europe as well, where member states differ amongst 
each other in their policy orientations that guide their enforcement ef-
forts.17 
                                                
 12. See, e.g., GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (1991); Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and 
Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977); Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Techno-
logical Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71 (1990); Steven Salop, The Noisy Monopolist: Imperfect In-
formation, Price Dispersion, and Price Discrimination, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 393 (1977). 
 13. Albert A. Foer, The Goals of Antitrust: Thoughts on Consumer Welfare in the US 2 (Am. 
Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 05-09, Aug. 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103510. 
 14. See generally RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, 
RHETORIC, LAW (revised ed. 1996); see also Foer, supra note 13, at 23 (“There is a danger in having 
economic policies, including antitrust, swing widely from administration to administration, with 
reversals taking a toll in the inability of businesses to plan for the future. While change of direction 
as a result of election politics is legitimate, it is arguably better for the antitrust system if change 
takes place more incrementally.”). 
 15. Foer, supra note 13, at 2. 
 16. See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 8. 
 17. Wernhard Möschel, The Goals of Antitrust Revisited, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 7, 9–11 (1991) (arguing that a pluralist view predominates the debate on the 
goals of antitrust in Europe, and he explores this pluralism in Germany, France, and EC competition 
regulations); Laura Parret, The Multiple Personalities of EU Competition Law: Time For a Compre-
hensive Debate on its Objectives, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW 61, 61 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 
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The fact that the Western world lacks a clearly defined goal form-
ing its consensus on how to guide antitrust enforcement gives developing 
countries a rare chance to make a political choice with regard to what 
policy to choose. Had there been a Western consensus as to the desirable 
antitrust policy, it would have definitely been transposed together with 
the transplantation of the antitrust law itself to developing countries. 
Nonetheless, choosing which policy to guide the enforcement pro-
cess is, in and of itself, no easy task. The question about the normative 
baseline for antitrust theory lies at the root of much controversy in anti-
trust. The debate is not only with regard to what is the one goal to guide 
antitrust enforcement,18 but also whether multiple goals are a better alter-
native to a monist reading of the purpose of antitrust.19 
This Article’s aim is to critically analyze these goals and to con-
tribute to these debates by advocating that developing countries should 
enforce their antitrust laws with the realization of long-term growth and 
overall productivity in mind. This should also be coupled with redistribu-
tion to assure that their often-impoverished consumers are not paying the 
costly price of allowing firms and industries to grow. These intertwined 
objectives shall assure that developing countries’ antitrust policies are 
used as part of a development plan with more to achieve than is possible 
with simple static goals. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part II maps out alternative 
goals that have been used to guide antitrust enforcement, listing the vary-
ing policy orientations, their merits, and critiques. Part III discusses the 
goals actually chosen by developing countries. It highlights how most 
developing countries list a variety of goals in their antitrust laws, without 
consideration to the welfare tradeoffs that these goals entail. Part IV 
makes a normative claim to the goal that should guide antitrust enforce-
ment in developing countries. It argues that dynamic efficiency, through 
its promotion of research and innovation, is the most likely goal to be in 
line with an overall developmental agenda important for developing 
countries to pursue. Part V concludes and lists further extensions to this 
research, particularly the debate surrounding how to achieve dynamic 
                                                                                                         
2012) (arguing that “[m]ultiple objectives still exist [in EC competition law] and they are not a thing 
of the past as is sometimes suggested”). 
 18. Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What 
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1977). 
 19. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Wel-
fare and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1053 (1987); Michael E. Porter, Compe-
tition and Antitrust: Towards a Productivity-based Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ven-
tures, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 919, 933 (2001); Stucke, supra note 8, at 611. All of these authors pro-
pose a hierarchical or balancing approach to be followed when selecting amongst several goals of 
antitrust. 
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efficiency and the assessment of enforcement activities against the yard-
stick of dynamic efficiency and growth. 
II. MAPPING OUT DIFFERENT POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
Before introducing the different goals that have been widely used in 
antitrust enforcement, it is important to note that some of these goals are 
conflicting. There is even conflict as to how to achieve any one goal, es-
pecially dynamic efficiency, as briefly introduced above. But where the 
conflict is even more pronounced is when two goals, especially efficien-
cy-based goals, are simultaneously considered as guides for enforcement. 
This is, in most cases, extremely problematic and is often referred to as 
welfare or efficiency tradeoffs in reference to the seminal article by Oli-
ver Williamson.20 Hence, a country is advised to pick one policy frame-
work to guide its enforcement activities.21 Nevertheless, the reality is that 
many countries swing between these listed goals, yet at any given inves-
tigation, there will be only one dominating orientation, otherwise the de-
fendant could be found both guilty and innocent.22 
Given the variety of goals used to guide antitrust enforcement and 
that many of them are incompatible, it is highly essential for an enforcing 
authority to frame its guiding policy in a clear and transparent manner. 
Such clarity and transparency will allow the enforcement process to be 
stable, predictable, and accountable. When these aspects are lacking, es-
pecially in developing countries, antitrust enforcement could be suscep-
tible to cronyism, nepotism, and corruption.23 It would also lead to gen-
eral confusion for firms, disrupting the proper functioning of the market 
place. Bork and Bowman stress the need for such ex ante clarity: 
How could one know in a particular case whether the court would 
apply a rigorously pro-competitive rule or the social policy of pre-
serving small business units from aggressive behavior? When the 
person whose conduct is to be judged is in doubt concerning which 
                                                
 20. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
 21. See infra notes 238–239 and accompanying text. 
 22. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Anti-
trust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471 (2012) (examining three kinds of conduct 
(all-or-none-offers, two-part pricing, and collusion in bidding) that “have purely distributional ef-
fects. On total welfare grounds, they are unobjectionable, but they are clearly objectionable on con-
sumer welfare grounds”). 
 23. Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination and Competition Law: Lessons from and for 
South Africa and Indonesia, 41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 579, 592 (2000) (“[T]he existence of wide swaths 
of ambiguity in the competition law could play into the hands of state officials, who could be in-
clined to discriminate in favor of their ‘own’ and may have the freedom to do so without accounta-
bility.”). 
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of two completely contradictory policies will be applied, the system 
hardly deserves the name of law.24 
In an attempt to facilitate the mapping of the different policy orien-
tations, the possible goals of competition policy enforcement are grouped 
in two loose categories: efficiency-based and non-efficiency-based 
goals.25 The first group encompasses goals aiming at achieving allocative 
efficiency, productive efficiency, economic efficiency, and dynamic effi-
ciency. The second group includes goals targeting the protection of small 
businesses; achieving international competitiveness; eradicating poverty; 
and promoting fairness, equality and justice.26 
It is worth noting that two often mentioned goals are not discussed 
here: economic freedom and promotion of competition. The first goal—
economic freedom—is considered an unhelpful guide as an objective 
policy choice, as freedom is a relative term and cannot be easily defined 
in general or in particular as it relates to antitrust enforcement.27 The se-
cond goal, promotion of competition, is considered a description of a 
market structure, i.e., a means to achieve an end and not an end result 
itself.28 Choosing it as a goal necessarily means that it is desirable for the 
belief that it is responsible for realizing other goals. For some, promoting 
a competitive market is desirable because of its effect on lower prices in 
terms of allocative efficiency; yet for others, it is desirable as it leads to 
more dynamic efficiency.29 Pursuing competition as an antitrust objective 
necessarily contains a hidden presumptive goal that is not spelled out ex 
ante and thus fails at being a proper guiding objective policy.  
                                                
 24. Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 363, 370 (1965). 
 25. This categorization follows David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of 
Mergers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 797 (1989). 
 26. Id. (stating the more frequently used dichotomy is economic and noneconomic goals, but 
“those labels are less useful than the ones proposed because there is substantial economic content in 
the social and political goals [the latter refer to the non-efficiency goals]”). 
 27. Stucke, supra note 8, at 592–93 (“[P]romoting economic freedom inherently involves 
trading in some people’s freedom to promote others’. To make that trade-off, one invariably relies 
on other values and goals besides economic freedom. Accordingly economic freedom cannot be the 
primary goal.”). 
 28. Id. at 596 (“[C]ompetition, however defined, is not the ultimate end. Competition instead 
represents the means to achieve broader government objectives for the economy or for a given in-
dustry.”). 
 29. See infra text accompanying notes 283–294. 
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A. Efficiency-based Goals 
1. Allocative Efficiency (Consumer Welfare) 
A consumer welfare standard to guide antitrust policy defines the 
mainstream today.30 It is the most widespread welfare criterion pro-
nounced in developed countries’ antitrust laws and case law,31 and it is 
also the standard most widely replicated by developing countries.32 It is 
important to note that this consumer welfare is not the consumer welfare 
standard that Judge Bork articulated as the guiding principle of antitrust. 
Bork used “consumer welfare as an Orwellian term of art that has little or 
nothing to do with the welfare of true consumers.”33 Bork’s “consumer 
welfare” better lends itself to be discussed below when talking about to-
tal welfare or economic efficiency as the guiding objective of antitrust.34 
In economic terms, consumer welfare is defined as consumer sur-
plus,35 which is the difference between what consumers were willing to 
                                                
 30. John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting 
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 242 (2008) (“In mainstream 
antitrust law, there is only one goal in addition to protecting buyers. When small suppliers are threat-
ened by anticompetitive behavior, Congress wanted to protect them from exploitation as well, so 
long as this could be accomplished without causing purchasers to pay supracompetitive prices. In 
both sell-side and buy-side cases, in short, the ultimate goal is the same—competitive prices . . . for 
all.”). 
 31. Id. at 211–12 (in reference to American case law, the authors argue: “In recent years, the 
case law has largely adopted the view that the ultimate goal of the antitrust laws is to protect con-
sumers, not to increase efficiency.” They list the case law supporting their claim on pages 213–27.). 
 32. INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT 
LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED 
MONOPOLIES 9 (2007) [hereinafter ICN REPORT 2007], available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf (thirty of thirty-three 
countries identified consumer welfare as an antitrust objective). 
 33. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 30, at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. 
at 200 (“If he had been honest, Bork would have used ‘total welfare’ as the synonym for economic 
efficiency, the term employed by the economics profession for this purpose.”); see also id. at 206 
(“His deceptive use of the term ‘consumer welfare,’ instead of the more honest term ‘total welfare,’ 
was a brilliant way to market the efficiency objective.”); see also Stucke, supra note 8, at note 85 
(citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 704 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., 
writing for the majority) (“The allocative-efficiency or consumer-welfare concept of competition 
dominates current thinking, judicial and academic, in the antitrust field.”). 
 34. BORK, supra note 9, at 90 (“Consumer welfare is greatest when society’s economic re-
sources are allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants fully as technological con-
straints permit. Consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely another term for the wealth of the na-
tion.”); see also id. at 91 (“These two factors may conveniently be called allocative efficiency and 
productive efficiency. . . . These two types of efficiency make up the overall efficiency that deter-
mines the level of our society’s wealth, or consumer welfare. The whole task of antitrust can be 
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so 
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.” (emphasis in original)). 
 35. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1033 (“Using the more precise language of economics, 
consumer welfare can be defined as consumer surplus, which is that part of the total surplus that 
accrues to consumers.”). 
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pay for a good and what they actually paid. In Figure A.1 found in the 
appendix to this Article, the competitive price (Pc) and competitive 
quantity (Qc) are given by the equality of price and marginal cost 
(P=MC), which reigns under perfect competition. Here, the consumer 
surplus is equal to the triangle PcAB. Antitrust enforcement that cares 
about the maximization of consumer surplus will be intolerant towards 
activities that allow firms to raise prices, as this will automatically result 
in a reduction of consumer surplus. As can be seen from the same figure, 
if the seller acquires market power, allowing him to increase price to Pm, 
quantity will fall to Qm and consumer surplus will shrink to PmCB. A 
monopolist maximizes profits when setting price and output at a level 
that equalizes marginal cost (MC) and marginal revenue (MR). Such an 
increase in price and loss of consumer welfare also result in the emer-
gence of an allocative inefficiency, labeled deadweight loss (DWL). This 
DWL is illustrated in Figure A.1 by the triangle EAC. 
The literature presents two approaches treating consumer welfare as 
the goal of antitrust, each with a slightly different focus. The first ap-
proach seeks to protect consumer surplus or consumer property from be-
ing stolen by firms with market power.36 According to scholars in this 
camp, antitrust enforcement should prohibit any conduct that would lead 
to a reduction of consumer surplus, as this would amount to exploitation 
“that unfairly transfers [the wealth of consumers] to firms with market 
power.”37 What is important to this line of argument is the prevention of 
wealth transfer, which is considered theft38 and takes place when “con-
sumers [are forced] to pay supracompetitive prices.”39 According to this 
approach, a consumer surplus standard better reflects society’s judg-
ments about the appropriate distribution of economic welfare.40 
The second approach to promoting consumer welfare focuses on 
preventing the deadweight loss (DWL) triangle from emerging—i.e., a 
desire for the economy to produce without any inefficient allocation of 
                                                
 36. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 30, at 201–06. 
 37. Id. at 192; see also id. at 196 (“The primary goal of antitrust is to protect consumers from 
paying higher prices to firms that have unfairly gained or maintained market power. The antitrust 
laws, in other words, can be explained as a congressional declaration that the property right we today 
call ‘consumers’ surplus’ belongs to consumers, not to cartels.”). 
 38. Id. at 202. 
 39. Robert H. Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfer (Not Just Efficiency) 
Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 631, 637 (1989). 
 40. Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L., Autumn 2006, at 1, 8 (“Perhaps the leading philosophical claim made in 
favor of a consumer surplus standard is that it better reflects society’s judgments about the appropri-
ate distribution of economic welfare than does a total surplus standard.”). 
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resources.41 The advocates for allocative efficiency as the goal of anti-
trust argue that consumer welfare is maximized through the efficient al-
location of resources.42 This is achieved when “the existing stock of 
goods and productive output are allocated through the price system to 
those buyers who value them most, in terms of willingness to pay or 
willingness to forego other consumption.”43 
Allocative efficiency is commonly defined as Pareto optimality.44 
This takes place when no other distribution could make at least one 
person better off without making someone else worse off.45 Pareto 
optimality is considered a static goal, as it is occupied with maximizing 
consumption value at a fixed point in time.46 Static allocative efficiency 
is accomplished when prices are set at equilibrium—i.e., prices are set at 
the intersection of the supply and demand curves, implying price is equal 
to marginal cost. According to the first theorem of welfare economics, 
the market at competitive equilibrium will lead to Pareto-efficient alloca-
tion of resources.47 
Both approaches caution against higher prices that will lead to ei-
ther wealth transfer or allocative inefficiency, depending on the approach 
one follows to define consumer welfare.48 Yet, those focusing on wealth 
                                                
 41. Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary 
Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347 (“A person concerned about consumers’ welfare (a 
convenient shorthand for the allocative efficiency costs of monopoly) must be exceedingly suspicious 
of claims that new products or low prices injure consumers by excluding rivals.” (emphasis added)); 
F. M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 998 (1987) (“From the 
standpoint of those who stress the desirability of allocative efficiency, [the deadweight loss] triangle 
is what antitrust is all about.”). 
 42. Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1982) (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 103 (1978)). 
 43. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1025. 
 44. Hovenkamp, supra note 42, at 8 (“The most common definition of allocative efficiency is 
Pareto optimality.”); Stucke, supra note 8, at 579 (“Another definition of allocative efficiency is 
Pareto efficiency.”). 
 45. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–16 (1960). 
 46. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1027 (“[A]llocative or pricing efficiency in output markets is 
concerned with maximizing the consumption value of the existing stock of social wealth. Thus, 
allocative efficiency, which is achieved when goods are priced at marginal or incremental cost, 
maximizes social wealth at a fixed point in time.”). 
 47. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 20–21 (1988) (“Weak assump-
tions about preferences and technological possibilities yield general results on competitive equilibri-
um. The best-known of these may be the two fundamental welfare theorems. Roughly stated, the 
first says that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal (that is, a benevolent and fully informed 
social planner could not replace the competitive allocation of goods with another feasible allocation 
that would increase all the consumers’ welfare) and the second asserts that, under convexity assump-
tions (which rule out increasing returns to scale), any Pareto-optimal allocation can be decentralized 
(implemented by a market organization) by a choice of the right prices and an appropriate redistribu-
tion of income among consumers.”). 
 48. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 30, at 240–41 (stating that allocative inefficiency or wealth 
transfer lenses to screen antitrust violations will not cause much difference: “[M]ost situations of 
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transfer emphasize that focusing instead on allocative inefficiency does 
not yield the same outcome. “Do terms like ‘stealing,’ ‘robbery,’ ‘extor-
tion,’ and ‘stolen wealth’ sound like allocative inefficiency?”49 For 
Kirkwood and Lande, promoting consumer welfare is the goal of anti-
trust “not because it would enhance economic efficiency, but because it 
would prevent powerful firms from unfairly extracting wealth from their 
trading partners.”50 Therefore, this goal is clearly distinct for them from 
one that cares about allocative inefficiency.51 
Also, caring about allocative efficiency does not always increase 
consumer welfare, particularly when the seller is practicing highly dis-
criminatory pricing strategies.52 In the case of perfect price discrimina-
tion, all consumers will buy the product at a price that will leave them 
without any consumer surplus. At the same time, no deadweight loss will 
emerge, and hence allocative efficiency is attained. 
Some have argued that allocative efficiency and consumer welfare 
are incompatible when competitors lower production costs but still man-
age to raise prices.53 Yet, this is not true; any price increase, even with 
cost efficiencies, is bound to create a deadweight loss, and hence alloca-
tive inefficiency. Figure A.2 shows that regardless of the magnitude of 
the cost efficiencies, if market power leads to any (even insignificant) 
price increase, then a DWL triangle will emerge. This is because any 
price increase above marginal cost is bound to reduce output, which in 
turn will lead to a welfare loss to society (DWL) by misallocating socie-
ty’s resources.54 The lost output leads to lower profits earned by the mo-
nopolist and reduced customer value by forcing buyers to buy less than 
they would have at the equilibrium price. This misallocation of society’s 
                                                                                                         
antitrust concern (such as routine horizontal price fixing) give rise to both allocative inefficiency and 
a transfer of wealth from purchasers to the cartel. Cartels, for example, would be condemned under 
either approach, and it does not matter very much why we condemn them.”). 
 49. Id. at 202. 
 50. Id. at 242; Lande, supra note 39, at 631 (“The main purpose of the antitrust laws is to 
prevent firms from acquiring and using market power to force consumers to pay more for their goods 
and services. Congress was primarily concerned that corporations would use market power ‘unfairly’ 
to extract wealth from consumers.”). 
 51. Lande, supra note 39, at 637 (“Our goal is to prevent this transfer as an end in itself, not 
because it causes inefficiency.”). 
 52. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1033. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law 2 (The Harvard 
John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 693, May 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1873432 (“[T]he term deadweight loss refers to 
the sacrifice in total surplus due to price being elevated above marginal cost (which welfare loss is 
the excess of consumers’ valuations over marginal cost for units not purchased due to price eleva-
tion).”). 
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resources leads to a poorer society given that its resources could have 
been used more productively.55 
No DWL triangle will emerge only when the cost efficiencies are 
so significant that they will lead to prices at least equal to marginal 
cost.56 Thus, from this perspective, allocative efficiency and consumer 
welfare compatibly aim towards pricing efficiency, or marginal cost 
pricing.57 This is because when prices are set at marginal cost, no 
deadweight loss will emerge, consumer surplus will be maximized, and 
no welfare tradeoffs will have to be considered. 
Another way to look at realizing the goal of consumer welfare is 
through limiting market power—the variable that gives firms the ability 
to raise prices and sustain high margins.58 It is also sometimes regarded 
as a form of distributive justice, which maximizes consumer welfare at 
the expense of firms.59 
Despite consumer welfare being one of the dominating terms in an-
titrust discourse, there is no clear consensus as to what it actually 
means.60 It is considered to some extent “the most abused term in modern 
antitrust analysis.”61 This is particularly true due to the confusion created 
by Robert Bork when he used the term to describe economic efficiency, 
or total welfare.62 An illustration of the lack of consensus in reference to 
                                                
 55. EARNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 72 (5th ed. 2004). 
 56. See Figure A.2 infra. 
 57. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1025; Stucke, supra note 8, at 580 (“Some view allocative 
efficiency as ‘leading firms to produce output up to the point where the marginal cost of each unit 
just equals the value of that unit to consumers.’”). 
 58. Lande, supra note 39, at 631 (“The main purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent firms 
from acquiring and using market power to force consumers to pay more for their goods and services. 
Congress was primarily concerned that corporations would use market power ‘unfairly’ to extract 
wealth from consumers.”); Porter, supra note 19, at 933 (“Drawing on Welfare theory, the primary 
focus in U.S. antitrust for the last twenty years has been on limiting price/cost margins or firm 
profitability (allocative inefficiency) as the most important outcome for consumers. Market power is 
seen as giving firms the ability to elevate prices and sustain high margins. Hence, limiting market 
power is the major focus of attention.”). 
 59. Blair & Sokol, supra note 22, at 13. 
 60. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1020. 
 61. Id. at 1032. 
 62. BORK, supra note 9, at 107–15. For a reference to this confusion, see Blair & Sokol, supra 
note 22, at 7 (“[T]he ambiguity arose as a result of Robert Bork’s use of the term consumer welfare 
to mean total welfare.”); Brodley, supra note 19, at 1032; Foer, supra note 13, at 6 (“[B]ut what does 
[Bork] mean by consumer welfare? His answer constitutes one of the great acts of academic leger-
demain . . .”); Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917, 918 (1987) 
(“Chicagoans assert an ahistorical view of antitrust. They rationalize the history of antitrust to fit 
their economic model. They declare that the only significant goal of the Congress that passed the 
Sherman Act was to enhance consumer welfare (a term that they then misdefine).”); Stucke, supra 
note 8, at 572; see Fox, supra, at 918 n.7 (“Chicagoans define ‘consumer welfare’ as the sum of 
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the term is found in an International Competition Network (ICN) survey 
of fifty-seven authorities, which found that only seven authorities agreed 
with the provided definition of consumer welfare; namely, consumer 
welfare as it relates only to consumer surplus and excludes noneconomic 
considerations.63 
Another problem with consumer welfare as the goal of antitrust is 
how to define the consumer. Is the consumer only the individual who 
uses the good, or does it refer to all direct and indirect users who are af-
fected by the anticompetitive agreement, behavior, or merger in ques-
tion?64 The way the consumer is defined may lead to different interpreta-
tions of the standard.65 When the market is not a final-goods market, then 
a consumer surplus standard favors buying firms over selling firms.66 In 
addition, consumers do not all have the same welfare preferences, and 
they even might have conflicting preferences at times.67 
A further critique focuses on the distributive objectives advanced 
by adopting a consumer welfare standard. According to Louis Kaplow, 
such distributive objectives lead to 
[the adoption of] less efficient rules (ones that fail to maximize total 
welfare) because of their more favorable distributive consequenc-
es—[which] is an inefficient means to redistribution. Accomplish-
ing the same degree of redistribution through the tax and transfer 
system allows the redistribution to be achieved at lower cost, which 
means that both producers and consumers can be made better off. 
Thus, if the purpose is to help consumers as a whole, using a means 
to help them less hardly makes sense.68 
                                                                                                         
producers’ and consumers’ welfare, on the theory that consumers will be better off if producers 
make more money because producers will invest that money in things consumer want.”). 
 63. Stucke, supra note 8, at 571. 
 64. Id. at 573. 
 65. Id. (“If the consumer is anyone who uses the economic goods, or ‘refers to all direct and 
indirect users who are affected by the anticompetitive agreements, behavior or merger in question,’ 
then everyone—from the poorest individual to the wealthiest corporate monopoly—is a consumer. 
The consumer welfare standard then becomes a total welfare standard, which raises separate 
concerns over the distribution of wealth. If the consumer, however, is said to include poor 
individuals but exclude wealthy monopolies (and other corporate purchasers of goods and services), 
then the definition becomes more political and subjective. Therefore, the way in which the consumer 
is defined leads to different interpretations of the consumer welfare standard.”). 
 66. Farrell & Katz, supra note 40, at 11–12. 
 67. Hovenkamp, supra note 42, at 6. 
 68. Kaplow, supra note 54, at 3; id. at 19 (“[I]t is more efficient to confine competition law to 
the maximization of total welfare and achieve redistribution solely through the tax and transfer sys-
tem. The same redistribution can be achieved at less cost, or more redistribution at the same cost; in 
general, all income groups can be made better off.”). For a similar argument, see generally LOUIS 
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 403–63 (2002) (arguing that giving 
weight to nonwelfarist considerations entails endorsement of the view that it is sometimes best to 
make everyone in society worse off). 
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Similarly, Farrell and Katz have argued: 
Consumer surplus can provide a very poor approximation to a wel-
fare measure that weights impacts using ordinary notions of distri-
butional preferences. One reason is that rich and poor consumers 
may be differentially affected by an antitrust decision; distributional 
concerns would suggest weighing the impact on the poor more 
heavily, but a consumer surplus standard insists that they count 
equally.69 
Michal Gal has also argued that “making broad policy decisions 
that might carry social, political or cultural consequences is not within 
the mandate of the antitrust authority and may even impair democratic 
values. Public policy should rather be determined by the government.”70 
Moreover, some have critiqued the occupation of antitrust only with 
consumers and have considered this to be a choice to serve the interest of 
a particular class of society.71 This is true given that a consumer welfare 
standard, regardless of its definition, is bound to create a zero-sum game 
between consumers and firms.72 It also rests on “the unsubstantiated, 
relatively esoteric, and counter-intuitive premise that low prices and high 
quality sum-up the consumer’s welfare preferences.”73 
A further critique of the consumer welfare standard is that it fails to 
take account of product value by its focus on prices.74 In some instances, 
prices might rise to improve value.75 Such a narrow focus on price with-
out due consideration to value ignores “the long-term trajectory of value, 
                                                
 69. Farrell & Katz, supra note 40, at 11. 
 70. Michal S. Gal, Reality Bites (or Bits): The Political Economy of Competition Policy in 
Small Economies 11 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-22, 2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901756. For a similar argument, see Michael E. Porter, Michael 
Porter on Competition, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 841, 874 (1999) (“[I]nequality is more a failure of 
government policy and institutions than a failure of capitalism. The focus should be on addressing 
the root causes of inequality, not stopping or distorting the competitive process in the vain hope of 
achieving equal outcomes.”). 
 71. Foer, supra note 13, at 17. 
 72. Porter, supra note 19, at 935. 
 73. Hovenkamp, supra note 42, at 20. 
 74. Porter, supra note 19, at 935. 
 75. Id. at 934 (“Roughly speaking, productivity is price times quantity divided by the quantity 
of labor or capital involved. It can be divided into two distinct components: the prices that products 
command in the marketplace (which reflect value) and the efficiency with which a unit of product 
can be produced. Thus, productivity is enhanced not just by efficiency improvements, but also by 
improvements in product quality, features, and services [that better meet customer needs and justify 
a higher price]. . . . With a focus on price/cost margins, however, high prices are often seen as inher-
ently undesirable for consumers. Higher prices should be a danger sign in antitrust analysis only if 
they are not justified by rising customer value.”). 
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prices, and costs [that we care much more about] than we do about con-
sumer welfare in the short-run.”76 
Furthermore, defining consumer welfare or allocative efficiency as 
Pareto optimality leads to its own set of critiques. Primarily, the fact that 
“Pareto optimality is an abstract perfect state that no society will ever 
reach. The voluntary market actually contains many imperfections, the 
exchangeable commodities change daily, and the vast majority of 
interactions between members of society are not voluntary transactions at 
all, but unexpected, unavoidable, or coerced ones.”77 This makes the 
standard unattainable and hence ineffective as a guiding enforcement 
tool. 
A final critique to the consumer welfare standard is made with ref-
erence to other goals that are arguably more important. Porter argues that 
“[b]y relying too heavily on narrowly conceived consumer welfare 
theory, antitrust policy may be overlooking some of the most important 
benefits of competition for society.”78 Loss of consumer welfare is tem-
porary, but the realization of production or innovation efficiencies has 
multiplier effects on the growth and wealth of societies.79 
2. Productive Efficiency (Producer Welfare) 
Productive efficiency is achieved when goods are produced using 
the most cost-effective combination of productive resources and existing 
technologies, or in other words, when a firm produces at minimal cost. 
Bork has referred to productive efficiency as “competitive effective-
ness.”80 Productive inefficiency results when firms are unable to exploit 
economies of scale, or as a result of X-inefficiencies—for example, when 
managers pursue goals other than profit maximization.81 
In economic terms, productive efficiency is defined as producer 
surplus or welfare, which is measured as the difference between what 
producers are willing to sell a good for and the actual price they receive 
for the sold good. In Figure A.3, producer surplus is illustrated by trian-
gle ECPc (whereas consumer surplus is shown by triangle BCPc). Given 
a steady supply curve slope, a higher sales price will yield greater pro-
ducer surplus. One can also think of producer surplus as profits, as it is 
                                                
 76. Id. at 935. 
 77. Hovenkamp, supra note 42, at 9. 
 78. Porter, supra note 19, at 920. 
 79. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1039. 
 80. BORK, supra note 9, at 106. 
 81. Wolfgang Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an 
Economist on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
COMPETITION LAW 4 (Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot & Joel Moneger eds., 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075265. 
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the value of what producers have produced minus the cost of produc-
tion.82 
From an antitrust policy perspective, any policy that aims at in-
creasing the reward to producers will tend to ignore consumers. The aim 
of such policies becomes encouraging producers to maximize their prof-
its, which is often achieved when they are allowed to grow up to the 
point when they can exploit economies of scale. Once producers reach 
this point, they will also be able to produce at the minimum efficient 
scale of production. Consumers might benefit in the long run from pro-
ducers operating at economies of scales, as the supply curve might be 
shifted outwards due to decreases in the cost function. This could result 
in lower prices over the long run. 
Those who have advocated for a productive efficiency standard to 
guide antitrust have claimed that productive efficiency has a multiplier 
effect on the growth of social wealth.83 As compared to allocative 
efficiency, production and innovation efficiencies make a more powerful 
contribution to social wealth because they comprise the growth factors 
by which social wealth increases over time.84 They are also responsible 
for increasing social wealth over the whole range of output because the 
gains from lower production costs are recurring and cumulative.85 
Nonetheless, productive efficiency, albeit beneficial to society in 
some cases, has many drawbacks. Primarily, it aims at strengthening a 
group of society that is in no need of further strengthening. Producers, as 
a class, are far more homogeneous, organized, and powerful than con-
sumers.86 They also possess information asymmetries, better possibilities 
of lobbying, and rent-seeking.87 Some are also already protected through 
trade barriers and antidumping duties.88 
For producers to achieve economies of scale they might need to ac-
quire higher levels of concentrations, which might increase their ability 
to achieve market power and thus charge much higher prices above 
                                                
 82. Foer, supra note 13, at 19. 
 83. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1039. 
 84. Id. at 1027. 
 85. Id. 
 86. OLIVER BUDZINSKI, THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION: COMPETENCE 
ALLOCATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY 61 (2008) (“Generally, groups of producers 
can exert more lobby pressure on politicians than consumers (due to their poor degrees of both ho-
mogeneity and organization).”). 
 87. Kerber, supra note 81, at 12. 
 88. José Tavares de Araujo Jr., Legal and Economic Interfaces Between Antidumping and 
Competition Policy, 25 WORLD COMPETITION 159, 172 (2002) (“Like other conventional trade bar-
riers such as tariffs and quotas, antidumping belongs to a generation of policy instruments that were 
designed to protect domestic producers from international competition.”). 
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costs.89 In doing so, producers would redistribute part of the consumer 
surplus to increase their own producer welfare. 
As such, although productive efficiency may at first glance appear 
to further goals that have a multiplier effect, such as those achieved when 
producers operate at economies of scale, a closer look shows that much 
of the gain accrues to producers to the detriment of consumers. Thus, an 
antitrust policy that seeks to achieve productive efficiencies will likely 
introduce further inefficiencies and unwanted redistribution from con-
sumers to producers. 
3. Economic Efficiency (Total Welfare) 
Economic efficiency, or total welfare, as the normative baseline of 
antitrust enforcement and policy has gained widespread acceptance, ow-
ing to the writing of Chicago School economists and jurists, particularly 
Robert Bork, who has repeatedly stated that the sole goal of antitrust 
laws is to increase overall economic efficiency.90 Economic efficiency 
was declared by the Chicagoans to correspond to an enhancement of 
consumer welfare, which they define as the sum of producers’ and con-
sumers’ welfare, on the theory that consumers will be better off if pro-
ducers make more money because producers will invest that money in 
things consumers want.91 By defining consumer welfare in this manner, 
Chicago School antitrust argues for a total welfare criterion to guide anti-
trust policy—disguising it as a consumer welfare one. 
According to Robert Lande, the efficiency-only story came to rule 
as the primary purpose of antitrust due to the term “consumer welfare” 
chosen by Robert Bork.92 Lande explains that 
Bork’s brilliant but deceptive choice of the term “consumer wel-
fare” as his talisman, instead of a more honest term like “total wel-
fare,” “total utility,” or plain “total economic efficiency” [was the 
reason for the triumph of the efficiency-only goal of antitrust.] After 
all, who can be against “consumer welfare”?93 
Consumer welfare, as defined by Chicago School scholars, has little 
or nothing to do with the welfare of consumers.94 According to Bork’s 
definition of the term, it refers to the “maximization of . . . consumer 
                                                
 89. MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 52 (2003). 
 90. BORK, supra note 9, at 10, 15–16, 90–91. 
 91. Fox, supra note 62, at 918. 
 92. Lande, supra note 39, at 638. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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want satisfaction.”95 Whether due to this play on words, or for other rea-
sons, Chicagoans and many non-Chicago antitrust scholars claim that 
economic efficiency as the goal of antitrust has reached uniform consen-
sus.96 This sentiment is paramount in Posner’s following quote: 
Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today—
whether as a litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed ob-
server—not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws 
should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees on the es-
sential tenets of economic theory that should be used to determine 
the consistency of specific business practices with that goal.97 
A total welfare standard implies the maximization of producer and 
consumer surplus (total surplus) to the extent that it outweighs any inef-
ficient allocation of resources (deadweight loss, DWL). It calls for effi-
cient allocation of resources as the sole goal of antitrust.98 This standard 
corresponds to the Kaldor–Hicks welfare criterion, also known as the 
potential Pareto standard.99 Using a Kaldor–Hicks efficiency standard, an 
outcome is more efficient if those that are made better off could in theory 
compensate those that are made worse off while still being in a better 
position.100 In other words, applying a Kaldor–Hicks efficiency standard, 
an outcome is considered effficient if the rewards to winners outweigh 
                                                
 95. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7 
(1966). 
 96. See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY, THEORY AND PRACTICE (2004); Robert H. 
Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1967); Dennis W. Carlton, Does 
Antitrust Need to Be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 155 (2007); Elzinga, supra note 18; Farrell & 
Katz, supra note 40; Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010); Möschel, supra note 17, at 8 (“Advocates of monism see only one 
worthwhile purpose of antitrust law—the fostering of economic efficiency . . . .”); Richard A. 
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932 (1979); Donald F. 
Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 
1208–09 (1969). 
 97. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001). For a similar sentiment, see 
Hovenkamp, supra note 42, at 4 (“Only . . . [the] wealth maximization . . . definition of efficiency 
[Kaldor–Hicks efficiency] can even arguably serve as a statement of efficiency goal for the antitrust 
laws.”). 
 98. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources 
of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1218 (1977) (“Indeed Chicago analysts tend to 
identify the efficient allocation of resources, a value derived from neoclassical economics as the sole 
goal of antitrust.”). 
 99. Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 549–50 (1939); J. R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 9 
ECON. J. 696 (1939); see also Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1037 (1990) (“In the late 1930s Nicholas Kaldor and John R. Hicks attempted 
to increase the usefulness of ordinalist welfare economics for policy analysis through the develop-
ment of the ‘potential’ Pareto criterion sometimes known as ‘Kaldor–Hicks efficiency.’”). 
 100. See Kaldor, supra note 99; Hicks, supra note 99. 
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the losses suffered by the losers. However, no actual compensation needs 
to be made for an outcome to be considered to meet the Kaldor–Hicks 
efficiency criterion. If, somehow, compensation is indeed made, then the 
outcome will also meet the stricter Pareto criterion as well. According to 
the latter, an outcome is Pareto-efficient if no one can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off.101 
According to an economic efficiency model, a merger, joint ven-
ture, or cartel that is charging higher prices in the short-run may still be 
considered “efficient” and will not be prohibited or blocked if it manages 
to realize cost efficiencies that increase producer surplus more than the 
higher prices reduce consumer surplus. In this case, a balancing of the 
improved efficiency against the cost of allocative inefficiency needs to 
take place. This balancing follows a typical Williamson efficiency trade-
off analysis.102 
Figure A.4, infra, illustrates such an efficiency tradeoff. Here, you 
see a merger or joint venture that manages to reduce cost from MC—
under perfect competition—to MC1. Nonetheless, this cost efficiency is 
realized alongside an increase in market power, which increases price 
from Pc under perfect competition to Pm. The quantity is also reduced 
from Qc to Qm. Because of this market power, an allocative inefficiency 
takes place in the form of a deadweight loss given by triangle ECB. Pro-
ducer surplus increases by the rectangle PcEBPm because of the market 
power, and because of the cost savings it also increases by the rectangle 
GFEPc. On the other hand, consumer surplus has shrunk from triangle 
PcCA to PmBA, or in other words, by the deadweight loss and the in-
crease of producer welfare due to market power. To approve a merger or 
joint venture under a total welfare standard, the gain made by producers 
needs to be sufficient to compensate the consumers and still make pro-
ducers better off. If this is the case, then the merger or joint venture is 
considered to be Kaldor–Hicks efficient. 
To verify whether the merger or joint venture meets the wealth-
maximization criteria, the cost savings, represented by rectangle GFEPc, 
needs to be greater than the allocative inefficiency, given by the triangle 
ECB. If this is so, then the merger or joint venture is approved. This is 
the same as assessing whether the gain in producer surplus, shown by 
rectangle GFBPm (this includes the producer surplus resulting from the 
market power and from the cost savings) is greater than the loss in con-
sumer surplus, given by rectangle PcEBPm (which is considered to be 
                                                
 101. See, e.g., VILFREDO PARETO, COURS D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (1896). 
 102. Williamson, supra note 20. 
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redistributed from consumers to the producers because of the market 
power) and the deadweight loss triangle (ECB). 
According to some, a repeated application of the Kaldor–Hicks 
welfare criterion would result in a Pareto-superior situation, as all per-
sons will be both winners and losers in different situations.103 Similarly, 
those who call for a total welfare standard in merger policy argue that 
many consumers might also be shareholders of firms, and hence a bal-
ancing of the winner–loser role will lead to a Pareto-efficient situation 
for all.104 
Another argument for why a total welfare criterion should guide an-
titrust enforcement is that the cost savings that result in producer surplus 
also have positive consequences on consumers; namely, they free re-
sources that can then be used to produce goods and services in other 
markets at lower prices.105 Such “consumer benefits flowing from these 
cost savings may be diffused throughout the economy, but they exist 
nonetheless.”106 
Michal Gal also argues that economic efficiency should be the 
guiding enforcement goal of antitrust in small economies: “Small econ-
omies should strive to achieve economic efficiency as their main goal 
because they cannot afford a competition policy that is prepared to sacri-
fice economic efficiency for broader policy objectives.”107 Gal states that 
small size should tip the balance in favor of the total welfare standard for 
two reasons. First, requiring a high standard of proof of no negative ef-
fect on consumer welfare may lead to market stagnation of oligopolistic 
structures because most markets in small economies are so concentrat-
ed.108 As a result, the oligopolistic structures will not only charge su-
pracompetitive prices, but they also will not achieve productive efficien-
cy.109 Thus, the total welfare approach will reduce productive and even 
dynamic inefficiencies. Second, the consumer welfare approach may 
                                                
 103. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common 
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). 
 104. Kai Hüschelrath & Jürgen Weigand, A Framework to Enforce Anti-Predation Rules 5 
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 106. Id. at 485. 
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 108. Id. at 203. 
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conflict with the goal of enhancing the international competitiveness of 
domestic firms.110 
Many do not appreciate the merits of a total welfare approach.111 A 
frequent critique is that the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency criterion is strongly 
influenced by value judgment and amounts to a political decision.112 For 
example, current stockholders are allowed to reap the benefits of a mer-
ger at the expense of the class of consumers who are forced to pay for a 
higher-priced good from the merged entity.113 In doing so, this efficiency 
criterion allows individual rights to be infringed to increase the general 
wealth of society. It ignores the distributive impact of the so-called effi-
cient policies and outcomes, thereby leading to a complete disregard to 
equity considerations. 
The efficiency view of antitrust is another form of “trickle-down 
economics.” According to Kirkwood and Lande, it embodies 
the hope that if we allow businesses to take from consumers in the 
short run, then eventually, somehow, in some indirect, uncertain and 
difficult to explain long-run manner, the money will find its way 
back to society as a whole, including consumers . . . . But no one 
knows what will actually happen in the long run, such as whether 
the public at large eventually will benefit, because the long run is 
much more uncertain. . . . In the long run economists remind us that 
we are all dead . . . .114 
A further critique worth mentioning regarding the Kaldor–Hicks ef-
ficiency criterion is about fairness. Applying a total welfare standard bal-
ances injured consumers against overall economic efficiency, yet it does 
not consider that the injured consumers might not be the same ones who 
will presumably benefit at a later date from the trickle-down benefits to 
the whole society.115 
Finally, under this efficiency criterion, the initial endowments, fac-
tors, and entitlements of the different actors (consumers and producers in 
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our case) are ignored.116 This further distorts the distribution of income 
and creates a bias towards the status quo, as the assignment of initial en-
titlements will affect the outcome of a Kaldor–Hicks application.117 
4. Dynamic Efficiency (Promoting Innovation/Growth) 
Dynamic efficiency, also referred to as technological progress or 
innovation efficiency,118 is achieved “through the invention, develop-
ment, and diffusion of new products and production processes that in-
crease social wealth.”119 A product innovation can shift the demand 
curve to the right, while a process innovation can lower the marginal cost 
curve, resulting in an outward shift of the supply curve. 
This innovation efficiency criterion, if chosen as the goal of anti-
trust law, shifts the focus from both consumers and producers to innova-
tion. The aim becomes making the pie larger through emphasizing the 
centrality of innovation, which is considered “the single most important 
factor in the growth of real output in the United States and the rest of the 
industrialized world.”120 Innovation efficiency is also responsible for 
providing the greatest enhancement of social wealth.121 According to 
Kerber, 
Since it is an undisputed empirical fact that technological progress 
is the most important determinant for long-term economic growth, 
there is also a wide-spread consensus that innovation and diffusion 
of new products and technologies is one of the important results ef-
                                                
 116. Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 208 (1980) (“If econom-
ic analysis makes someone’s initial right to his own labor depend upon whether he would purchase 
the right if assigned to another, that right cannot be ‘derived’ from economic analysis unless we 
already know who initially has the right. This appears to be a serious circle. We cannot specify an 
initial assignment of rights unless we answer questions that cannot be answered unless an initial 
assignment of rights is specified.”). 
 117. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 426 (“For example, it may be that if polluters are entitled to 
pollute, the neighboring landowners could not possibly buy them out, whereas if they are entitled to 
clean air, they would demand far more than the factory could pay for a release. Since the wealth 
effect generated by the initial setting of the entitlement in question tends to make that setting appear 
to be the efficient one at the conclusion of the analysis, it is sometimes described as introducing a 
bias in favor of the status quo.”). 
 118. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1025. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1026 (quoting Ziv Griliches, R&D and Productivity: Measurement Issues and 
Econometric Results, 237 SCI. 31, 34–35 (1987)); see also Porter, supra note 19, at 922 (“The fun-
damental benefit of competition is to drive productivity growth through innovation, where innova-
tion is defined broadly to include not only products, but also processes and methods of management. 
Productivity growth is central because it is the single most important determinant of long-term con-
sumer welfare and a nation’s standard of living.”); Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the 
Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957); Lester C. Thurow, A Weakness 
in Process Technology, 238 SCI. 1659, 1660–62 (1987). 
 121. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1026. 
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fective competition should bring about. This innovation dimension 
of competition is often linked to the term “dynamic efficiency.”122 
In 1942, Joseph Schumpeter challenged the traditional static models 
of analysis, arguing that what really mattered for economic well-being in 
the long run was how well entrepreneurs seized opportunities for reduc-
ing cost through innovation rather than how efficiently resources were 
allocated and utilized.123 
Because innovation impacts a nation’s standard of living, growth, 
and social wealth, Joseph Brodley and Michael Porter have argued that 
“antitrust enforcement should give priority to advancing innovation,”124 
and thus, “the new standard for antitrust should be productivity growth, 
rather than price/cost margins or profitability.”125 Because innovation is 
the accelerator of growth, it becomes the intermediary focus of antitrust 
enforcement.126 Brodley has also argued that consumer welfare should be 
subordinated to long-run efficiencies, as long as consumers will eventu-
ally share in the economic welfare promised by innovation.127 Phillip 
Areeda argues that “[t]he benefits of competitive pricing are not nearly 
so great as the benefits of inventions, new products, new processes, and 
other innovations.”128 
Innovation efficiency and consumer welfare could, in some in-
stances, compliment each other. Yet in some other situations, they could 
be found to be incompatible in the sense that consumers might suffer 
short-term harm in the pursuit of innovation and growth. Although this 
might seem like an undesirable antitrust goal, a closer look illustrates 
                                                
 122. Kerber, supra note 81, at 5. 
 123. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (3d ed. 1984) 
(“Economists are at long last emerging from the stage in which price competition was all they 
saw. . . . [I]t is not that kind of competition which counts but the competition from the new commod-
ity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the largest-scale 
unit of control for instance)—competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and 
which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foun-
dations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other as a 
bombardment is in comparison with forcing a door.”). 
 124. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1032 (“[A]s an enforcement ideal, antitrust should strive to 
achieve all three types of efficiencies. But in a less than ideal world, where not all goals can be 
achieved simultaneously, antitrust enforcement should give priority to advancing innovation and 
production efficiencies in view of their cardinal importance in creating social wealth. Most certainly, 
antitrust should not pursue allocative efficiency alone.”). 
 125. Porter, supra note 19, at 932. 
 126. Id. at 934 (“Because of its direct effect on productivity growth, the most important goal 
for society is a healthy process of dynamic improvement, which requires innovations in products, 
processes, or ways of managing. If the rate of dynamic improvement is healthy, over time this 
dominates static technical and allocative efficiency concerns.”). 
 127. Eleanor M. Fox, “Antitrust Welfare”—The Brodley Synthesis, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 
1378 (2010). 
 128. Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 531 (1983). 
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how consumers are ultimately set to gain, especially when redistribution 
is factored into such a policy.129 
In pursuit of innovation efficiency, rules should allow firms to in-
novate. But scholars disagree about the market structure that encourages 
firms to innovate. Some argue that competitive markets encourage more 
innovation,130 while others, following Schumpeter, argue that only firms 
with high market concentrations will be able to invest in innovation.131 
But if monopoly power is a necessary condition for innovation, pursuing 
innovation as a goal for antitrust enforcement could be quite worri-
some.132 
Promoting innovation as the goal of antitrust elicits a couple cri-
tiques. First, that innovation does not need further encouragement under 
antitrust laws, given that it is already protected through the patent sys-
tem.133 The patent system automatically generates positions of monopo-
lies that are, in theory, “the enemy” of the antitrust system. Therefore, 
arguing for an antitrust policy that pursues the protection and encour-
agement of innovative efficiency might seem, at first glance, to promote 
an unsound policy framework. 
Further, because it is quite difficult to measure innovation efficien-
cy, it might be problematic to use it as a guide for antitrust enforce-
ment.134 It is also problematic to distinguish between socially beneficial 
and harmful innovation that is still under development.135 These technical 
complexities may stand in the way of its utility as a successful efficiency 
criterion. 
Because “economic theory has not successfully integrated the inno-
vation dimension into general equilibrium theory, the problem of techno-
logical process and, therefore, dynamic efficiency remains, to a large 
extent, outside the mainstream neoclassical equilibrium theory.”136 Thus, 
this standard presents a complicated goal for antitrust enforcement. 
                                                
 129. See infra Part IV. 
 130. See, e.g., infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 131. See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 132. Foer, supra note 13, at 30. 
 133. Id. (“The conundrum of intellectual property is that there may be such a thing as too much 
protection.”). 
 134. Stucke, supra note 8, at 583. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Kerber, supra note 81, at 6. 
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B. Non-efficiency-Based Goals 
1. Protecting Small Businesses 
Alternatively, antitrust enforcement goals can aim to protect small 
businesses to assure that the free market does not cause them harm. His-
torically, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the antitrust statutes to 
protect small businesses.137 A quote from Judge Learned Hand attests to 
this intention: “[O]ne of [the] purposes of [the antitrust statutes] was to 
perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an 
organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete 
with each other.”138 
The Warren Court identified small business as a protected class un-
der the antirust laws.139 Warren-era decisions were more inclined to favor 
small business and condemn practices that reduced cost or generated 
more desirable products.140 These practices were condemned because 
they harmed rivals who were unable to match them, despite benefiting 
consumers at large.141 In many cases, the Court ended up condemning 
mergers because of, rather than in spite of, efficiencies.142 
The Brown Shoe decision exemplifies application of this goal.143 In 
this opinion, the Court declared that despite the fact that the antitrust 
laws protect competition and not competitors, “we cannot fail to recog-
nize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of 
viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occa-
sional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of 
fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing consider-
ation in favor of decentralization.”144 
                                                
 137. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989) (“Sen-
ator Sherman was not speaking for consumers of refined petroleum products, but rather for the small 
producers and refiners whom Standard Oil had driven to ruin.”); see id. at 29 (“The principal victims 
of the trust movement of the 1880s—certainly of the trusts that appeared most frequently on Con-
gress’ hit list—were inefficient small firms, rather than consumers. Competitors were the principal 
protected class of the Sherman Act.”). 
 138. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 139. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 1 
(2005). 
 140. Id. at 315 (“E.g. . . . Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), which con-
demned a horizontal merger in a highly competitive market with easy entry, in part because the 
resulting firm would be able to undersell its rivals; and FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 586 
(1967), which condemned a conglomerate merger for creating efficiencies that rivals were unable to 
match.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See supra note 140 (for the cases cited). 
 143. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 144. Id. at 344. 
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Protecting small businesses, as an antitrust goal, is not unique to 
outdated American jurisprudence; modern American statutes145 and sev-
eral European countries still endorse it as a goal of antitrust enforcement. 
French competition law allows for exceptions to the application of the 
law based on a wide range of public interest considerations.146 It allows 
for group exceptions for individual types of agreements by way of regu-
lations “if they are aimed at an improvement of the management of small 
or medium-sized undertaking.”147 The same holds true in German law, 
where Section 5b GWB allows cooperation between small and medium-
sized corporations by excluding them from some restrictions that apply 
to large corporations.148 Also, modern Canadian antitrust policy explicit-
ly seeks not only to promote economic efficiency, but also to protect 
small and medium-sized businesses.149 
Some argue that protecting competitors under antitrust laws is a 
matter of justice, stating that “[t]he dogma that ‘antitrust laws protect 
competition not competitors’ overstates the case and ignores considera-
tions of justice.”150 Others promote the desirability of this goal as a 
means to allow 
economic power not [to] be concentrated in the hands of a few large 
firms, but rather distributed over many smaller ones, even though 
the resulting inefficiencies in production and distribution will yield 
higher prices. That preference is particularly likely if people believe 
that a high degree of economic concentration poses a political 
threat, such as a loss of some democratic freedoms.151 
Yet others argue that this goal is noble in its aim to maintain a 
“more convivial” marketplace, whereby the little neighborhood grocery 
is protected from the conglomerate supermarket chain. Despite the little 
                                                
 145. U.S. statutes that are argued to support small businesses include the Celler Kefauver Act, 
Clayton Act, and Robinson-Patman Act. 
 146. Möschel, supra note 17, at 10. 
 147. Id. (quoting Article 10.2 of the French Competition Law). 
 148. Id. at 9. 
 149. Canadian Competition Act of 1985, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 1.1 (Can.) (“The purpose of 
this Act is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and 
adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian participation in 
world markets while at the same time recognizing the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order 
to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in 
the Canadian economy and in order to provide consumers with competitive prices and product 
choices.” (emphasis added)). 
 150. Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1076, 1078 (1979); id. at 1076 (“I would not yield as freely as he does to the dogma that the 
antitrust laws protect ‘competition not competitors,’ because the goals of justice and the antitrust 
laws sometimes demand protection of competitors.”). 
 151. Hovenkamp, supra note 42, at 21. 
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neighborhood grocery’s higher prices, protecting small business assures 
the continuity of familiar and warm human interactions.152 
However, this protection goal is heavily critiqued. Robert Bork 
considered antitrust policy aimed at protecting small businesses a means 
to create “shelters for the inefficient”153 and “an ugly demand for class 
privilege.”154 Other critics argue that small businesses do not need spe-
cial laws or protection from fierce competition, especially given that 
such protection often results in higher prices and inferior quality for con-
sumers. In a way, protecting small businesses amounts to levying a tax 
on consumers to guarantee that the smaller businesses remain in the mar-
ket. Bork sarcastically summarizes: 
Too few people understand that it is the essential mechanism of 
competition and its prime virtue that more efficient firms take busi-
ness away from the less efficient. Some businesses will shrink and 
some will disappear. Competition is an evolutionary process. Evolu-
tion requires the extinction of some species as well as the survival 
of others. The business equivalents of the dodoes, the dinosaurs, and 
the great ground sloths are in for a bad time—and they should be. It 
is fortunate for all of us that there was no Federal Biological Com-
mission around when the first small furry mammals appeared and 
began eating dinosaur eggs. The commission would undoubtedly 
have perceived a “competitive advantage,” labeled it an “unfair 
method of evolution,” and stopped the whole process right there.155 
Despite the critiques, many countries support protecting small busi-
nesses as an antitrust goal to encourage domestic competition and the 
establishment of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
2. International Competitiveness / National Champions 
Many countries, particularly developing ones, consider protecting 
their national industry from foreign competition an important antitrust 
policy that allows them to establish a level playing field for their domes-
tic firms in international markets.156 Encouraging national champions 
entails laxer domestic competition law enforcement—at least with re-
spect to those national champions. Proponents of such a policy reason: if 
                                                
 152. Id. (“Some people unquestionably prefer the smile of their neighborhood grocer to the 
relative impersonality of the supermarket, even though the neighborhood grocer charges higher 
prices.”). 
 153. Bork & Browman, supra note 24, at 369. 
 154. Id. at 370. 
 155. Bork & Bowman, supra note 24, at 375. 
 156. See Table A.1, infra (Kenya, Namibia, and South Africa). 
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the local producers are to compete in international markets, they should 
be given some slack in the local enforcement of competition laws. 
Laws supporting this goal should allow for either export cartels, 
mergers to concentration in key industries, or discriminatory enforce-
ment against companies considered national champions. Such policies 
would allow local firms to compete effectively with their Western coun-
terparts, as larger enterprises are required to promote the technical 
change necessary for international competitiveness.157 Arguably, larger 
firms will be able to achieve minimum efficient scale of production and 
produce greater economies of scale than their smaller counterparts. 
Similarly, some scholars argue the importance of protecting infant 
industries from fierce competition at the early stages of their develop-
ment so that they can compete domestically and internationally. Antitrust 
laws can thus be used to protect both nascent firms and those that are to 
be fostered for the international markets.158 The protection of the latter 
can be evaluated, for example, against the firm’s performance on interna-
tional markets and the realization of preset export targets.159 This protec-
tion can take the form of selective antitrust enforcement, allowance of 
higher concentration levels (through, for example, laxer merger enforce-
ment), higher prices, and certain types of unilateral conduct and agree-
ments necessary to achieve this end; for example, the allowance of ex-
port cartels. 
In many instances, this policy goal is part of an industrial policy tai-
lored towards encouraging local firms to compete internationally. The 
Japanese and South Korean policies offer a clear example of intertwined 
competition and industrial policies.160 Alice Amsden and Ajit Singh ar-
gue that the approach taken by the Japanese government 
[is] more pragmatic . . . to antitrust enforcement, one that makes al-
lowances for national goals such as industrial catch-up. It takes into 
account other collective values and extenuating circumstances in 
weighing enforcement decisions against the letter and spirit of anti-
trust laws. Included here are such considerations as economies of 
scale, enhanced efficiency, optimal use of scarce resources, interna-
                                                
 157. Amsden & Singh, supra note 7, at 944 (characterizing these prevailing practices as the 
“anti-competitive bias of many of MITI’s policies and actions”). 
 158. Porter, supra note 70, at 862 (“Nurturing ‘infant industries’ to allow them to achieve 
critical mass is also important.”); Claudio R. Frischtak, Bita Hadjimichael & Ulrich Zachau, Compe-
tition Policies For Industrializing Countries, 7 WORLD BANK POL’Y & RESEARCH SERIES 2 (1989) 
(“Developing countries should use competition as a powerful tool of industrial policy. It is an in-
strument that might have been unavailable in the early stages of industrial development, but it is 
more effective than government controls and incentive systems in the presence of functioning mar-
kets and a dynamic entrepreneurial class.”). 
 159. Id. at 4. 
 160. See Amsden & Singh, supra note 7. 
2015] Antitrust Goals in Developing Countries 973 
tional competitiveness, heightened productivity, business cycle sta-
bilization, industrial orderliness, price stabilization and economic 
security.161 
However, the experiences of East Asian economies differ from 
those in centrally planned Eastern European, former Soviet Union, and 
socialist countries in Africa and Latin America. In those areas, the gov-
ernment tolerated neither competition nor openness under the guise of 
protecting the local production and their national champions.162 Domestic 
firms that have been granted complete protection from competition have 
in many instances underperformed rivals, local or foreign, that operated 
in more competitive environments.163 The failure of such extreme protec-
tioninst policies testifies to the inadequacy of complete protection of na-
tional industries.164 
Contrastingly, in East Asian economies, the government did not 
shield local firms to the same extent. For example, during Japan’s years 
of rapid growth (1950–1973), the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) encouraged cartels in a wide range of industries,165 mer-
gers between leading firms in key industries,166 and vigorous domestic 
rivalry and international competitiveness.167 
Importantly, no Japanese industry was totally shielded from compe-
tition. MITI provided a “crucial coordinating role and orchestrated the 
dynamic of collusion and competition which characterizes Japanese in-
dustrial policy.”168 Young industries in the development phase remained 
protected from competition only until they matured technologically.169 At 
that point, the government allowed competition until the industries in 
question would face a competitive decline; then, the government again 
would discourage competition.170 MITI facilitated this “life-cycle” pro-
cess by organizing an investment race, setting exports and international 
market shares as significant performance targets.171 
                                                
 161. Id. at 944 (quoting D. I. OKIMOTO, BETWEEN THE MITI AND THE MARKET 12–13 (1989)). 
 162. Id. at 943. 
 163. See generally infra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 164. Amsden & Singh, supra note 7, at 943 (“The economic failings of the highly monopolized 
and closed centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union do not sug-
gest that the other extreme of almost zero competition and almost zero openness has much to rec-
ommend it either.”). 
 165. Id. at 944. These cartels included “export and import cartels, cartels to combat depression 
or excessive competition, rationalization cartels, etc.” Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 945. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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Crucially, MITI made sure to install strict performance standards 
for protected industries to assure that the import ban would not result in 
technological backwardness and inferior performance.172 To illustrate 
this approach taken by Japan, Amsden and Singh write: “The emphasis 
on exports and maintaining oligopolistic rivalry—instead of concentrat-
ing resources and subsidies on a single ‘national champion,’ which many 
governments in their industrial policies are prone to do—are the key fac-
tors which distinguished Japanese policies from those of other dirigiste 
countries.”173 
The paradox of the Japanese economy is that, despite the weaken-
ing of the antimonopoly laws and the anticompetitive bias of many MITI 
policies, competition actually grew in Japan during the years studied;174 
that is, concentration ratios declined.175 The reason market concentration 
declined was not because of the effectiveness of competition policy, but 
because of the rapid growth of the economy.176 This economic growth 
was manifested by both increasing investments and, more importantly, 
new entry or expansion of smaller firms.177 
Despite the success of East Asian economies, many scholars cau-
tion against prioritizing industrial policy over competition policy. The 
problem is that such industrial policy was often used to continue protect-
ing mature industries against local and foreign competition in a way that 
hampered economic development beyond early industrialization.178 Mi-
chael Porter critically summarizes many such concerns: 
When local rivalry is muted, a nation pays a double price. Not only 
will companies face less pressure to be productive, but the business 
environment for all local companies in the industry, their suppliers, 
and firms in related industries will become less productive. This 
demonstrates in particular the danger in arguments about the crea-
tion of “national champions” in an industry in the home country in 
                                                
 172. Id. (“To illustrate, Japan’s machine tool industry was given selective tariff protection 
specifically for those machine tools with potentially high income elasticities of demand and high 
productivity growth rates. But machine tool builders benefiting from protection were required to 
produce at least 50% of their output in the form of computer numerically controlled machine tools 
by a certain date.”). 
 173. Id. at 946. 
 174. Id. (explaining that competition was measured by conventional industry concentration 
ratios). 
 175. Id. (“The average (unweighted) 3-firm concentration ratio was 57.6 in 1937, 53.5 in 1950, 
and 44.1 in 1962. Between 1950 and 1962, concentration increased in only three of 20 industries, 
stayed roughly the same in two, and fell in all the rest.”). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Frischtak et al., supra note 158, at 5 (“In many cases policies designed initially to provide 
temporary incubation for infant industries hardened into policies protecting mature industries from 
both domestic and international competition. As a result competitive markets did not develop.”). 
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order to gain the scale to compete internationally. Unless a firm is 
forced to compete at home, it will usually quickly lose its competi-
tiveness abroad.179 
Some measures of protective antitrust policies might be necessary 
so that developing countries overcome the industrial and development 
gap between them and more advanced nations. Selectively enforcing an-
titrust laws, together with industrial policy, to grant certain protective 
measures might help developing countries counterbalance some of the 
adopted neoliberal policies. These neoliberal policies have forced many 
of the developing countries to give up other protectionist measures nec-
essary for industrial catch-up and international competitiveness. It is, 
however, important to advocate for the more successful protectionist ap-
proach, such as the one followed by Japan and South Korea, where pro-
tection is conditional, temporary, and does not shield the protected indus-
try or firm from all forms of competition. 
3. Reducing Poverty 
Another goal of antitrust policy is reducing poverty. This goal reso-
nates with a pressing need of many developing countries. It also embrac-
es distributional concerns that are often ignored and are considered im-
portant policy questions to be addressed under the rubric of antitrust en-
forcement. Eleanor Fox, in advocating for this goal, called for widening 
the scope of antitrust as a tool for mobility and poverty eradication as 
part of a broader context of developing economics.180 She argued that 
antitrust laws could drive prices down and eliminate barriers, especially 
for basic necessities, which can help the poorest members of society.181 
As a result, businesses could afford better inputs, enabling domestic 
businesses to compete in the global economy.182 Fox writes: 
                                                
 179. Porter, supra note 19, at 931–32; see also Fox, supra note 127, at 1379 (quoting Joseph F. 
Brodley, Antitrust and Competitive Advantage in World Markets, 5 ANTITRUST 40 (1990) (review-
ing MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 170 (1990) (“Loss of domes-
tic rivalry is a dry rot that slowly undermines competitive advance by slowing the pace of innovation 
and dynamism.”)). 
 180. Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 SW. 
J. L. & TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 211, 212 (2007). 
 181. Id. at 219, 222 (“Not only do the poor suffer from prices that are too high, but they suffer 
from suppressed growth.”). 
 182. Id. at 223–24 (“The marketplace should give firms, including smaller and younger firms, 
a fair chance to compete on the merits of their product, free from artificial and unnecessary foreclos-
ing restraints by powerful firms. Empowerment to engage in markets free of unnecessary business 
restraints is the counterpart to de Soto’s vision of empowerment to engage in markets free from 
unnecessary government restraints. Undue market restraints, whether public or private, retard effi-
cient development.”). 
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Market tools are a very important part of the panoply of tools need-
ed to address world poverty and should be used liberally. These 
market tools include market-freeing measures that reduce prices. 
They also include antitrust priority-setting that targets conspiracies 
that raise the price of staples, such as milk, bread, transportation and 
utilities, helping the poor as well as those who are better off.183 
In a sense, this approach is about pricing efficiency, but only as it 
refers to necessities directly affecting the well-being of the population at 
large. However, what is different about this approach is that it incorpo-
rates the ladder of mobility idea that is created once barriers to entry are 
torn down. This ladder of mobility “opens the door to inclusion, from the 
poorest up[,] and it proposes to do so for pragmatic reasons of building a 
better society”184 to “enable mobility, incentivize entrepreneurship, and 
stimulate invention.”185 It assures that smaller and younger firms have a 
fair chance to compete free from artificial and unnecessary foreclosing 
restraints by powerful firms.186 
Eradicating poverty as a guide for antitrust enforcement is especial-
ly relevant for developing countries where a high percentage of the popu-
lation lives below the poverty line, and monopolies and cartels abuse the 
impoverished population further.187 Antitrust law can be used to deter 
these abusive practices, and encourage small firms and new entrants to 
participate in the economy.188 
Basically, this proposition expands the reach of competition laws to 
be part of a broader developmental agenda focused on economic devel-
opment. By doing that, competition laws may be used to facilitate devel-
opment, and not just to protect producers or local champions. Further-
more, competition legislation focused on narrow efficiency standards 
tends to entrench a political economy that favors the ruling elite and dis-
criminates against the masses. A neoliberal framework of competition 
laws will do little to help countries develop.189 Instead, such a framework 
                                                
 183. Id. at 219. 
 184. Id. at 222. 
 185. Id. at 220. 
 186. Id. at 223; Porter, supra note 70, at 874 (positing inequality is a result of “limits to compe-
tition—collusion, monopoly, and artificial restrictions on entry—that gives business owners too 
much power to appropriate returns.”). 
 187. Fox, supra note 180, at 226 (“Anticompetitive practices are rife in areas of physical and 
business necessity, such as milk, soft drinks, beer, chicken, sugar, cotton, paper, aluminum, steel, 
chemicals (for fertilizers), telecommunications including mobile services, cement and other con-
struction materials, transportation including trucking, shipping, and port access, industrial gases, 
banking, insurance, coal and electricity.”). 
 188. Id. at 227. 
 189. Id. at 215. (“This does not imply that antitrust for developing countries would or should 
look dramatically different from a developed country’s antitrust. There are reasons why it might look 
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will mirror the effects of laws based on liberalization, privatization, and 
globalization—a widening disparity of wealth.190 
Nevertheless, scholars often argue that competition law should not 
concern itself with developmental or redistributional goals,191 which 
should be left to government action specifically tailored to address such 
issues.192 However, developing countries often have benevolent govern-
ments that fail to introduce or implement such policies. Taxes are evaded 
and subsidies are slowly being lifted under the rubric of privatization and 
liberalization, leaving the masses at a loss. Laws are transplanted from 
the West with the promise of prosperity—competition law being no ex-
ception—and lead to nothing more than entrenchment of local structures 
of cronyism, statism, corruption, and income inequality. Thus, broaden-
ing the scope of antitrust in developing countries to include issues such 
as poverty eradication seems appealing as a policy framework. 
4. Fairness, Equality, and Justice 
A number of jurisdictions recognize promotion of fairness and 
equality as one of their antitrust laws’ objectives. A few scholars argue 
that such fairness goals are desirable competition policy frameworks, 
particularly Eleanor Fox: “[S]ome goals are more important than effi-
ciency. Achieving a more equitable distribution of opportunity may be 
such a goal.”193 
One of the often cited examples is South Africa, which states that 
its competition law considers a “broader range of considerations includ-
ing the promotion of a more equitable spread of ownership as well as the 
                                                                                                         
much the same, . . . but there are also reasons why the perspective might differ form the neo-liberal 
one that currently informs many antitrust laws of developed countries—a perspective that has ‘rela-
tively little resonance for the great majority of the population that is poor.’” (quoting Francis Fuku-
yama, Keeping Up with the Chavezes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at 7)). 
 190. Id. at 217. 
 191. This has been the trend since the Chicago School influence on competition law. See 
BORK, supra note 9, at 427 (“[T]he goal [of antitrust law] is maximum economic efficiency to make 
us as wealthy as possible. The distribution of that wealth or the accomplishment of noneconomic 
goals are the proper subjects of other laws and not within the competence of judges deciding anti-
trust cases.”). However, this does not negate the fact that prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions have 
attempted to address the issue of redistribution in competition cases. An example critiqued by Bork 
for doing that is Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), where the Court admitted 
the value of small-business welfare into the adjudicative process. 
 192. Elzinga, supra note 18, at 1194–95 (“Antitrust policy . . . need not concern itself directly 
with increasing the purchasing power of the poor because it accomplishes this indirectly when it 
prohibits cartels and monopolies in the single-minded pursuit of efficiency.”). 
 193. Fox, supra note 23, at 593; Kaplow, supra note 54, at 2 (“[D]istributive objectives are 
better achieved through the tax and transfer system, with competition law advancing total welfare 
and hence giving equal weight to consumer and producer surplus. A traditional argument for relying 
on taxes and transfers that applies in many contexts is that they are better targeted than indirect 
means, such as the use of competition law. This point is certainly true.”). 
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‘interests’ of workers.”194 According to its competition law, “the purpose 
of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in 
order to [among other goals] promote a greater spread of ownership, in 
particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged 
persons.”195 According to the Act, one may be deemed a historically dis-
advantaged person “if that person . . . is one of a category of individuals 
who, before the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa . . . came 
into operation [in 1993], were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on 
the basis of race . . . .”196 This definition also applies to associations 
where the majority members are considered historically disadvantaged as 
well as to firms controlled by such individuals.197 This is an important 
goal to a country like South Africa where its majority has been discrimi-
nated against through most of its history. 
In another attempt to promote equality, the South African Competi-
tion Act states that the Competition Commission may exempt an agree-
ment or practice from the application of its competition rules if it con-
tributed to the “promotion of the ability of small businesses, or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become 
competitive.”198 
Finally, the South African law furthers equality, fairness, and anti-
discrimination by allowing a merger to be justified on public interest 
grounds.199 This provision explains that the Competition Commission or 
the Competition Tribunal must consider, among other things, the effect 
that the merger will have on “the ability of small businesses, or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become 
competitive.”200 The same provision applies when considering whether to 
exempt an agreement otherwise prohibited.201 The availability of such 
exemptions for certain agreements and mergers can be construed to mean 
that South Africans are sometimes willing to pay a higher price for goods 
and services as a cost of including the historically excluded segments of 
its population into the marketplace.202 
Similar equity claims have been included in the Indonesian compe-
tition law, which is “infused with principles of equality of opportunity, 
                                                
 194. ICN REPORT 2007, supra note 32, at 18. 
 195. South African Competition Act, Act No.89 of 1998, ch. 1, para. 2(f) (S. Afr.). 
 196. Id. at ch. 1, para. 3, § (2)(a). 
 197. Id. at ch. 1, para. 3, § (2)(b)–(d). 
 198. Id. at ch. 2, pt. C, para. 10, § (3)(iii). 
 199. Id. at ch. 3, para. 16, § (3)(b)(ii). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at ch. 2, pt. C, para. 10, §3. 
 202. Fox, supra note 23, at 587 (“The South African competition law applies a limited measure 
of affirmative action.”). 
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fairness, equal treatment, and a leveling of advantage.”203  The inclusion 
of such equity claims is done against the backdrop of a society that has 
suffered from cronyism, nepotism, and corruption since its independence 
in 1945.204 Business was centralized in the hands of the friends of the 
government and the successful ethnic Chinese minority.205 When the 
competition law was adopted, it aimed at closing the social gap that had 
caused the economy to be uncompetitive, rearranging business activities 
so that they could grow in a fair manner and avoid the concentration of 
power around a certain person or group contradictory to the ideals of so-
cial justice.206 
Other equality considerations included in certain jurisdictions’ 
competition laws often address labor policies. For example, the German 
Competition law allows certain mergers, with prior approval by the Fed-
eral Minister for Economics, to be justified by an overriding public inter-
est, such as labor and industrial policy considerations.207 Also, the Euro-
pean Community (EC) competition law allows crisis cartels for social 
reasons.208 
The problems of using competition laws for equity ends include, 
among others, the difficulty of interpreting vague terms that are not sup-
ported by clear definitions. This leads to wide discretion for the enforc-
ing agency, creates ambiguity for businesses, opens the door for abuse by 
enforcers, and might result in lack of transparency for the public. 
Having presented the different policy alternatives that can guide an-
titrust enforcement, the next Part of the Article illustrates the choices 
actually declared by developing countries in their respective competition 
laws. 
III. POLICIES GUIDING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 
Most developing countries adopt competition laws with more than 
one enforcement objective.209 Contrastingly, more advanced countries 
focus their antitrust enforcement on the realization of only one goal, of-
                                                
 203. Id. at 592. 
 204. Id. at 589. 
 205. Id. at 589. 
 206. People’s Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia, Elucidation of the Law of 
the Republic of Indonesia, No.5, Concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair 
Business Competition, paras. 5–6 (1999) (quoted in Fox, supra note 23, at 590–91). 
 207. Möschel, supra note 17, at 9. 
 208. Id. at 10. 
 209. Table A.1, infra, summarizes the stated objectives guiding antitrust enforcement in fifty 
studied developing countries. 
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ten consumer welfare or economic efficiency.210 Looking at the goals 
listed in the antitrust laws of fifty developing countries,211 I found twelve 
principle objectives being pursued: protecting consumer interests; public 
interest; competition; economic efficiency; eliminating restrictive busi-
ness practices (RBPs); economic freedom; protecting small businesses; 
progress and development; fairness and equity; consumer choice; com-
petitive prices; and competition in international markets. Some develop-
ing countries pursue less frequently mentioned antitrust objectives: free-
dom of trade;212 promoting innovation;213 regional integration;214 em-
ployment;215 expanding the base of entrepreneurs;216 and spread of own-
ership.217 
Table A.1 illustrates that the overwhelming goal chosen by devel-
oping countries is the protection of competition. This appears as the sole 
goal for ten countries out of the forty-three that pursue it alongside other 
goals.218 For those ten countries, one can assume that they consider com-
petition an end in itself; for the other countries that choose competition 
alongside other goals, competition is rather a means to achieve other 
ends. 
Some of the goals chosen by developing countries are in conflict. 
An obvious conflict emerges for countries that aim at protecting their 
consumers, yet at the same time aim at protecting small businesses and 
promoting their domestic firms to compete internationally.219 As dis-
cussed above, protecting small businesses and encouraging international 
competition often means supporting higher prices to achieve these goals. 
This is clearly in conflict with a standard that aims at protecting consum-
er welfare, which is automatically reduced once prices rise. 
Another conflict emerges for countries that promote both consumer 
interest and economic efficiency, when consumer interest is understood 
to imply a consumer welfare standard and economic efficiency to imply 
                                                
 210. Stucke, supra note 8, at 567 (“[W]hile the United States sought a single economic anti-
trust goal, other countries enacted competition laws with more antitrust objectives.”). 
 211. See Waked, supra note 5 (explaining how these fifty developing countries were chosen as 
part of larger research based on the following criteria: (1) they are considered developing according 
to a World Bank classification of low income, lower middle income and high middle income econ-
omies in 2005; and (2) have adopted a competition law and set up an enforcing agency by 2007). 
 212. See Table A.1. These are: India, Philippines, and Zambia. 
 213. See Table A.1. These are: Kenya. 
 214. See Table A.1. These are: Kenya and Russia. 
 215. See Table A.1. These are: Namibia and South Africa. 
 216. See Table A.1. These are: Zambia. 
 217. See Table A.1. These are: Namibia and South Africa. 
 218. See Table A.1. These are: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Esto-
nia Lithuania, Mongolia, Montenegro, and Turkey. 
 219. See Table A.1. These are: Colombia and Kenya. 
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a total welfare standard.220 The previous discussion has demonstrated 
how these welfare standards are incompatible and would, in most in-
stances, lead to opposite outcomes if applied to the same case. For exam-
ple, a merger might be approved under a total welfare standard, even 
when consumers are harmed, when the gain to the merging firms out-
weighs the harm suffered by consumers. However, applying a consumer 
welfare standard would block such a merger. If economic efficiency is 
understood to refer to allocative efficiency instead, then no such conflict 
emerges. 
Ten countries follow only a consumer welfare standard,221 and six 
countries follow only a total welfare standard. Many of the countries that 
pursue a consumer welfare standard are Eastern European, such as Lat-
via, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. This is in conformity with the more 
prominent EU objective of protecting consumer interests rather than 
achieving overall economic efficiency.222 The countries that aim at total 
welfare are Indonesia, Mexico, Namibia, Russia, South Africa, and Ven-
ezuela. 
Barbados, Colombia, Indonesia, Namibia, and South Africa aim 
their competition laws, among other things, to protect small businesses 
by giving them a level playing field to compete with larger businesses. 
Kenya, Namibia, and South Africa state international competitiveness as 
one of the goals they hope to realize with their competition policy. One 
would assume more countries to state both of these preceding goals as 
guiding enforcement objectives. We would expect that smaller, less-
advanced countries tend to use their competition policy to advance the 
competitiveness of small businesses locally and of their domestic firms 
internationally.223 
That only so few developing countries cite these goals is surprising. 
It might, however, be that they do not declare these goals as a policy ob-
                                                
 220. See Table A.1. Thirteen countries’ competitions laws aim at protecting consumers and 
promoting economic efficiency: Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Hungary, Kenya, 
Macedonia, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Serbia, and Zambia. 
 221. See Table A.1. These are: Armenia, Brazil, India, Latvia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Ro-
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 222. See Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation 
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 223. See supra Part II.B.1 and Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes. 
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jective, while still pursuing them in practice. One could also imagine that 
by not stating these goals, but instead citing some type of efficiency 
standard, some developing countries are signaling to the rest of the world 
that their antitrust laws are not used to promote controversial protection-
ist objectives. Instead, they attract foreign firms and investments by as-
suring them that they follow mainstream efficiency goals. This would 
also appear to be in line with the recommendation by international organ-
izations, such as the OECD, to shift away from the use of antitrust law to 
promote public interest objectives.224 
It is interesting to note that ten out of the fifty studied developing 
countries clearly spell out that their antitrust enforcement should aim at 
promoting progress and development.225 This is particularly intriguing 
given that pursuing progress and development is a rather unorthodox 
competition goal that has no counterpart in more advanced countries. It is 
quite important for developing countries to place their competition policy 
within a wider development framework as discussed before. The fact that 
so many actually state development as a competition goal attests to their 
aim at broadening the scope of antitrust to include pressing development 
needs. To formulate a competition policy that has development implica-
tions is rather complex. Yet, once such a policy has been untangled, its 
repercussions on growth and development would be extremely reward-
ing.226 
Three countries—Hungary, Indonesia, and South Africa—state that 
their antitrust laws pursue fairness and equity.227 In the case of both In-
donesia and South Africa, these provisions mainly apply to granting his-
torically disadvantaged persons access to the marketplace, as discussed 
above.228 It is a clear testament that competition policy can be used to 
achieve a more equitable distribution of the means of production. It also 
shows the extensive reach that competition policy can be used to achieve. 
Public interest guides antitrust enforcement in eleven developing 
countries.229 This goal is more general than consumer or producer inter-
ests, as it can be interpreted to encompass a variety of outcomes that ar-
guably serve the public at large. This allows, on the one hand, great flex-
                                                
 224. OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION, THE OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY 1, 3 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2486329.pdf. 
 225. See Table A.1. These are: Armenia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Namibia, Serbia, Slovakia, 
South Africa, Ukraine and Venezuela. 
 226. See Part IV. Discussing a proposition as to how to formulate a competition policy that 
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 227. See Table A.1. 
 228. See supra notes 193–206 and accompanying text. 
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ibility; yet, on the other hand, this goal leads to a lack of predictability 
and certainty. A public interest goal may open the door for disguised cor-
ruption and nepotism in the name of the public interest, and such broad-
ness is often discouraged. 
Eliminating restrictive businesses practices appears as an antitrust 
objective in the competition laws of thirteen developing countries.230 
However, explicitly including this goal as an objective of the law is ra-
ther unnecessary, as the aim of any law is to eliminate restrictive practic-
es that are not in conformity with the law. Nonetheless, some countries 
do find it important to spell it out as a guiding enforcement objective. 
Three remaining goals are mentioned in some developing countries’ 
antitrust legislations: assuring economic freedom (three countries),231 
providing consumer choice (two countries),232 and securing competitive 
prices (four countries).233 These goals are often subsumed under other 
objectives, such as economic efficiency and consumer interests. 
The International Competition Network (ICN) reported very similar 
results regarding the goals of antitrust, discussing thirty-three competi-
tion authorities’ responses to a questionnaire on the objectives of unilat-
eral conduct laws.234 Member countries considered ten different 
goals/objectives for their competition laws. These objectives, listed in 
order of the number of times cited by respondents, are: ensuring an effec-
tive competitive process; promoting consumer welfare; maximizing effi-
ciency; ensuring economic freedom; ensuring a level playing field for 
small and medium size enterprises; promoting fairness and equality; 
promoting consumer choice; achieving market integration; facilitating 
privatization and market liberalization; and promoting competitiveness in 
international markets.235 The first three listed goals are the most im-
portant goals for most jurisdictions, with the rest only mentioned by 
some jurisdictions and not others.236 Moreover, two subsequent ICN sur-
veys identifying the objectives of antitrust have found very similar re-
sults. The main goals continue to be the promotion of competition (both 
as a means to achieve other goals and as an end in itself), economic effi-
ciency, and increasing consumer welfare.237 
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Despite countries failing to unify antitrust enforcement around a 
singular objective, it is still considered better to pursue one goal rather 
than many.238 Having multiple goals guiding antitrust enforcement in 
developing countries is bound to create problems. According to Foer, 
There is indeed a yearning to find one goal, the single goal, because 
then one could design a system of antitrust that would appear to be 
scientific, objective, safe from the prejudices introduced by such 
human factors as politics. When multiple goals are acknowledged, 
logic is likely to suffer. Tradeoffs will have to be made. Discretion 
and hence politics will enter into the process. Compromise is messy. 
Outcomes [will] not necessarily [be] predictable . . . .239 
As a result, I will attempt to promote a one-goal oriented antitrust 
policy for developing countries in the next section. 
IV. RECOMMENDED ENFORCEMENT POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Developing countries face unique circumstances that make antitrust 
policy frameworks—which were initially suited for developed coun-
tries—inapt to address their needs.240 Policymakers in developing coun-
tries have, as discussed before, the flexibility to use their antitrust laws in 
ways that are not necessarily in line with the Western mainstream. They 
should ask themselves: Which antitrust policy is suitable to address the 
country’s “systemic poverty, aggravated by corruption, cronyism, selec-
tive statism, weak institutions, and often unstable democracy[?]”241 More 
importantly, they need to ask which antitrust policy promotes develop-
ment in a way to address these chronic problems.242 
Recently, Eleanor Fox recommended that “developing-country anti-
trust should aspire to fit the Spence Consensus, not the Washington Con-
sensus.”243 The Washington Consensus model of competition law is “[fo-
cused on removing] government barriers and distortions—licensing, 
                                                                                                         
istanbul.org/Upload/Materials/SpecialProject/SP_BackgroundReport.pdf; INT’L COMPETITION 
NETWORK, COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AND CONSUMER WELFARE—SETTING THE AGENDA 14 
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 238. Richard Schmalensee, Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in U.S. Antitrust, in HOW THE 
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECTS OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
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 239. Foer, supra note 13, at 31. 
 240. See Waked, supra note 1. 
 241. Fox, supra note 180, at 213. 
 242. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a 
Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries 3 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
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trade barriers, subsidies—and just let markets work.”244 It is “focused on 
increasing aggregate efficiency (aggregate wealth for the world). It as-
sumed that markets ‘let alone’ (business freedom) would increase aggre-
gate efficiency. It opposed policies that took account of distributional 
concerns and individual vulnerabilities, assuming that regard for these 
values undermines efficiency.”245 By advocating for the Spence Consen-
sus, Fox is referring to the Spence (World Bank) Growth Report, which 
was developed by the Spence Growth Commission, chaired by Nobel 
Laureate Michael Spence and comprised of experts principally from de-
veloping countries.246 The report concludes that “not only does growth 
critically matter, but inclusive growth critically matters. Distribution 
counts. And distribution of wealth and, more important for our purposes, 
of opportunity and chance for mobility was [and is] deeply skewed.”247 
According to Fox, competition policy in developing countries should aim 
at growth, distribution, and empowerment.248 
Similar to the aim of Fox, the idea is to outline a new direction for 
antitrust that better suits developing countries’ unique conditions.249 This 
new direction selects development and growth as the priority objectives 
of antitrust. Alice Amsden and Ajit Singh have already argued that the 
goal of antitrust in semi-industrial and transition economies should be to 
promote industrialization and economic growth.250 Michael Porter has 
also rejected “the Chicago School’s commitment to efficiency in favor of 
growth and innovation.”251 He argues that the “new thinking [about the 
goals of antitrust] sets forth productivity growth as the basic goal of 
antitrust policy.”252 Porter argues that productivity growth should be the 
new standard for antitrust for all countries, not just developing ones.253 I 
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argue that it is fundamentally more important for developing countries to 
target productivity growth with their antitrust laws. 
Two questions are important for developing countries to address in 
conjunction with realizing growth as an antitrust objective: (1) how 
growth is generated, and (2) how to formulate an antitrust policy that 
promotes the chosen growth accelerator. 
The first question does not have a straightforward answer. 
Economic growth theory has spanned various economic schools of 
thought, each providing a distinct answer to the question of how growth 
is generated. Four leading growth paradigms are generally addressed in 
this context.254 The first is the neoclassical growth model—also referred 
to as the Solow model255—which utilizes a production equation that 
expresses the current flow of output goods as a function of the current 
stocks of capital and labor.256 The neoclassical model assumes 
technological change or innovation as exogenous to the economic 
process. 
The other three growth models (the AK model, the Product–Variety 
model, and the Schumpeterian model) are all based on endogenous 
growth theories.257 The AK model, which is the first version of 
endogenous growth theory, does not, however, distinguish between 
capital accumulation and technological progress.258 Yet, the other two 
models are clearly innovation-based endogenous growth models. The 
Product–Variety model does not, however, incorporate a role for exit and 
turnover, which means it does not take account of the idea of creative 
destruction.259 Regardless of which of these new neoclassical models one 
chooses to follow, “identifying endogenous technological change as the 
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main driving force for economic growth obviously adds to the level of 
realism of growth theory.”260 
The Schumpeterian growth model, which is the one arguably more 
suitable for analyzing growth in developing countries,261 was initially 
developed by Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulous,262 and further 
elaborated by Aghion and  Howitt.263 This paradigm grew out of modern 
industrial organization theory and is called Schumpeterian—referring to 
Schumpeter’s creative destruction idea, where quantity-improving 
innovations are considered to render old products obsolete.264 According 
to this model, “faster growth generally implies a higher rate of firm 
turnover, because this process of creative destruction generates entry of 
new innovators and exit of former innovators.”265 
According to the Schumpeterian growth model, a country farther 
from the technological frontier will grow faster when innovating.266 This 
is particularly important for developing countries that are generally 
situated farther away from the global technological frontier. The closer 
countries move to the technological frontier, the more they need to shift 
from implementation-enhancing institutions to innovation-enhancing 
institutions to grow.267 This will allow them to catch up with the frontier 
level of GDP per capita.268 
The recent growth models have mainly shown the centrality of 
technological change and innovation to growth.269 This has also been 
backed up by empirical studies, which have found that innovation is the 
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most important factor for real output.270 Once innovation enters as an 
endogenous economic phenomenon in growth theories, the first 
fundamental welfare theorem holding that perfect competition generates 
optimal allocation of resources could be questioned.271 This is because of 
the possibility that monopolistic structures could be found to be 
necessary for innovation to occur.272 These are drastic policy shifts that 
challenge the conventional wisdom about the absolute benefit of perfect 
competition. This is related to the second question that developing 
countries need to address: how to draft a competition policy that furthers 
technological change and innovation, now that the latter has been found 
to be the accelerator of growth. 
Innovation is not only credited for its crucial role in generating 
economic growth, but is also responsible for expanding the domestic 
economy by introducing new products that consumers desire and 
lowering the costs of existing products.273 This reduction in cost has a 
direct benefit, freeing resources that can be used elsewhere in the 
economy and thereby increasing economic welfare if it results in lower 
prices and greater output.274 
Developing countries need to formulate a competition policy that 
strives at realizing these dynamic efficiencies instead of static ones. 
Scholars have already been calling for developing countries to pursue 
dynamic efficiency given its developmental impact.275 The competition 
policies adopted by developed countries are not often suitable for the 
developing world due to the fact that “[t]he attention to allocative effi-
ciency and lower prices that underlies competition policy in developed 
                                                
 270. See supra note 120 and accompanying text; see also Robert M. Solow, Technical Change 
and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957). 
 271. Verspagen, supra note 260, at 635 (“Both the presence of increasing returns and monopo-
ly power are important novelties in neo-classical growth theory. These features of the model shed a 
wholly different light upon the concept of perfect competition as a means to achieve a socially opti-
mal growth path.”); id. at 657 (“The . . . assumption . . . of monopoly power [which] is needed to 
generate innovation sheds new light upon the conclusion reached by general equilibrium models and 
welfare analysis that perfect competition in all markets generates an optimal result (in the sense of 
allocation of goods). New neo-classical growth models explicitly assume that a monopolistic market 
structure is necessary for innovation and therefore for economic growth. The role of competitive 
market as a means of generating efficient prices is thus no longer obvious. Anti-trust policy as a 
form of government intervention is no longer obviously related to a better (compared to the monopo-
listic market) allocation of goods. This is not to say that anti-trust policy may not be necessary. The 
point is merely that it is no longer obvious to make the point for perfect competition irrespective of 
what happens in the technological field.”). 
 272. SCHUMPETER, supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 273. Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in 
Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 573 (1995). 
 274. Id. 
 275. J. S. Metcalfe, R. Ramlogan & E. Uyarra, Economic Development and the Competitive 
Process 24 (Ctr. on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series, Paper No. 36, Dec. 2002). 
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countries may be too narrow and static from a development perspec-
tive.”276 Further, “it is usually understood that dynamic efficiency can 
have a far more dramatic effect on the economy than static efficiency, 
and this can be visualized by comparing the overall impact of improving 
the manufacturing process of a buggy whip with inventing the 
reciprocating engine.”277 
Joseph Brodley has argued that “[a]ntitrust law has always 
permitted some degree of social conduct that is not in the immediate 
interest of consumers in order to sustain innovation and production 
efficiencies.”278 For example, patent law temporarily grants the right of 
lawful monopolies to exist.279 Bordley further argues that, “whatever 
future benefits accrue to consumers generally through innovation and 
production efficiencies, the need to maintain producer incentives may 
require the consumers of a particular product to pay higher prices in the 
short run.”280 Consumer interest may be temporarily subordinated to the 
general welfare if (1) the activity may increase total social wealth by 
realizing significant production or innovation efficiencies; (2) the activity 
must be necessary to achieve such efficiencies; (3) the activity must not 
permanently suppress interfirm rivalry.281 Michael Porter has also argued 
that 
antitrust must move away from a narrow conception of welfare—
that is, whether a consumer has to pay more for a particular product 
at a particular point in time—to a broader conception of national 
welfare that encompasses the productivity of industry, including the 
wages paid to employees.282 
The challenge is figuring out how to pursue such dynamic efficien-
cy as the goal of antitrust. What developing countries need to address is 
“what the optimal degree of competition is for promoting dynamic effi-
ciency (in the sense of maximizing the long term rate of growth of indus-
trial and overall productivity).”283 There has been a long-standing debate 
about whether higher degrees of concentration or more competitive envi-
ronments are the appropriate basis for encouraging innovation.284 
                                                
 276. Id. 
 277. Foer, supra note 13, at 21. 
 278. Brodley, supra note 19, at 1036. 
 279. Id. at 1037. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 1037–38. 
 282. Porter Interview, supra note 253, at 5. 
 283. Amsden & Singh, supra note 7, at 941. 
 284. It is also known as the Schumpeterian vs. Darwinian debate. See Waked, supra note 1 for 
a summary of this debate. 
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Those in the Schumpeterian camp have their ideological underpin-
nings in the writings of Joseph Schumpeter.285 They consider monopoly 
power a necessity to generate innovation.286  According to Schumpeter, 
monopoly profits are necessary for firms to pursue R&D and innova-
tion.287 Schumpeter’s claims are: (1) only large businesses are able to 
achieve scale economies and bear the risks of investing in innovation;288 
(2) monopoly rents are an ideal source of funds to support industrial re-
search and innovation;289 and (3) a monopoly position is a security that 
makes investments in innovation seem worthwhile.290 Thus, a competi-
tion policy aligned with Schumpeter would be more accepting of higher 
levels of concentration through, for example, mergers that result in dom-
inance. 
On the other hand, those in the Darwinian camp argue that innova-
tion is stimulated in competitive markets.291 This is because each firm 
                                                
 285. SCHUMPETER, supra note 123. 
 286. See, e.g., F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 469–70 (2d ed. 1980); Philippe Aghion & Mark Schankerman, Competition, Entry 
and the Social Returns to Infrastructure in Transition Economies, 7 ECON. TRANSITION 79, 95–96 
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tions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097 (1965). 
 287. SCHUMPETER, supra note 123, at 106 (“What we have got to accept is that [the large-scale 
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and has no title to being set up as model of ideal efficiency.”). 
 288. Id. at 89 (“[L]arge-scale plans could in many cases not materialize at all if it were not 
known from the outset that competition will be discouraged by heavy capital requirements or lack of 
experience, or that means are available to discourage or checkmate it so as to gain the time and space 
for further developments.”). 
 289. Id. at 89–90 (“[E]nterprise would in most cases be impossible if it were not known from 
the outset that exceptionally favorable situations are likely to arise which if exploited by price, quali-
ty and quantity manipulation will produce profits adequate to tide over exceptionally unfavorable 
situations provided these are similarly managed.”). 
 290. Id. at 88 (“Practically any investment entails, as a necessary complement of entrepreneur-
ial action, certain safeguarding activities such as insuring or hedging. . . . Hence it becomes neces-
sary to resort to such protecting devices as patents or temporary secrecy of process or, in some cases, 
long-period contracts secured in advance. . . . [I]f a patent cannot be secured or would not, if se-
cured, effectively protect, other means may have to be used in order to justify the investment.”); id. 
at 102 (“Thus it is true that there is or may be an element of genuine monopoly gain in those entre-
preneurial profits which are the prizes offered by capitalist society to the successful innovator.”). 
 291. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Inven-
tion, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search ed., 1962); Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development and 
Diffusion, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849 (Richard L. Schmalensee & Robert D. 
Willig eds., 1989); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the 
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fears its products will be rendered obsolete by another firm’s innovation. 
Therefore, the more firms that compete, the higher the pressure to inno-
vate. Many empirical studies on whether competition or concentration 
provides better tools for growth conclude that competition has the greater 
effect.292 One of the most cited empirical studies is one of 640 U.K. 
companies that concluded that increasing levels of competition leads to 
increasing levels of total factor productivity growth, because competition 
exerts downward pressure on costs, encourages efficient production, and 
innovation.293 Others have argued that it is a combination of both market 
structures—in the form of an inverted U-shaped graph—that describes 
the relationship between competition and innovation.294 At low levels of 
competition, innovation will increase as more firms enter the market up 
to a point when a further increase in the number of firms will negatively 
impact innovation.295 
Given the variety of conclusions about how to promote innovation, 
the debate is far from being settled. Further research needs to study 
which market structure is more inclined to advance innovation in devel-
oping countries. Despite the difficulty of “the economics of innova-
tion . . . and our [limited] empirical knowledge[,] . . . innovation is too 
important for antitrust to use the limits of our knowledge as an excuse for 
failing to take action in appropriate cases.”296 Empirical studies have thus 
                                                                                                         
Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1980); Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 273, at 569; Tom Lee & 
Louis L. Wilde, Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation, 94 Q. J. ECON. 429 (1980); 
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REV. 1737 (2002); Mark A. Dutz & Maria Vagliasindi, Competition Policy Implementation in Tran-
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 293. See Stephen J. Nickell, Competition and Corporate Performance, 104 J. POL. ECON 724 
(1996) (the author proves with empirical evidence that competition, measured either by increased 
number of competitors or by lower levels of rents, is associated with higher rates of total factor 
productivity growth). 
 294. See Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 
Q. J. ECON. 701 (2005). 
 295. Id. at 707. 
 296. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW THE 
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECTS OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
ON U.S. ANTITRUST 51, 58 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
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far mainly focused on the developed world, with the exception of a few 
studies on one or two developing countries.297 Once conclusive cross-
nation empirical evidence is available, one of the two theories about 
market structures that generate innovation will prevail.298 Developing 
countries can then select this prevailing market structure to stimulate in-
novation while achieving growth and development. This lacking empiri-
cal evidence is crucial to give an ultimate answer to the second question: 
how to achieve dynamic efficiency and encourage innovation. Figure A.5 
illustrates the known and unknown parameters of the current new think-
ing of antitrust for developing countries. 
Regardless of the innovation-generating policy that developing 
countries choose, especially if it is one that accommodates market power, 
they should continue to assure that prices for necessities are not elevated. 
Developing countries face rampant poverty and should not force con-
sumers—through their antitrust policy—to pay higher prices for their 
necessary subsistence goods and services. They should also be open to 
incorporating redistribution, which is usually left to be tackled outside 
the realms of antitrust (through tax and transfer systems), into their anti-
trust policy. Einer Elhauge developed one such idea and it involves a 
consumer trust concept, which is funded by fixed cost efficiencies real-
ized to firms that acquire market power under a Coasian deal in merger 
review analyses to be redistributed back to the consumers.299 The idea is 
to translate fixed cost efficiencies into marginal cost reductions that di-
rectly benefit the consumers. Thus, a merger that improves fixed cost 
efficiencies, but increases prices, is still approved under a consumer wel-
fare standard.300 
                                                
 297. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion, Matias Braun & Johannes Federate, Competition and Produc-
tivity Growth in South Africa, 16 ECON. TRANSITION 741 (2008); Riadh ben Jelili, Markup Pricing 
and Import Competition: Has Import Disciplined Tunisian Manufacturing Firms? (Working Paper 
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think merging firms with large net efficiency gains in the offing could put together some sort of 
Coasian deal that makes them better off without harming consumers, unless the transaction costs of 
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 300. See Robert Rubinovitz, The Role of Fixed Cost Savings in Merger Analysis, 5 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 233 (2009) (detailing how fixed cost reductions are not considered effi-
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This concept is particularly interesting for developing countries if 
the cost efficiencies are generated through innovative improvements and, 
at the same time, cause consumers to suffer. In the cases when consum-
ers would not be drastically harmed through elevated prices, for example 
with more elastic goods, such a mechanism would be less of a concern. 
This model applies a Kaldor–Hicks efficiency standard, but finally in-
corporates actual redistribution. Here, all parties benefit. Firms and pro-
ducers can go ahead with their innovation-generating mergers or collabo-
rations because their novel market powers and higher prices are used to 
fund a consumer trust that is then redistributed back to the consumers 
once their cost functions are indeed reduced.301 
Promoting innovation and growth as an antitrust goal, therefore, 
needs to be aligned with a mechanism of redistribution through the anti-
trust rules. This guarantees that the benefits accrued through innovation 
and growth at the firm, industry, and national levels are felt by the con-
sumers who would have suffered had redistribution been ignored or left 
to be tackled through the tax and transfer system. This is particularly im-
portant given that awaited expectations from trickle-down economics in 
many developing countries have failed to be realized.302 
                                                                                                         
ciencies in U.S. merger analysis and a call for such fixed cost reductions to be considered efficien-
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merged entity to achieve the promised efficiencies. The benefits of such are threefold. First, the 
firms will be able to undertake their merger and realise their efficiencies. This will allow the firms to 
achieve dynamic efficiencies when they invest in R&D and innovate. Second, the merger will allow 
the firms to compete in international markets, which is often a major concern in developing coun-
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have more work options at the merged firm.” 
 302. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). 
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Arguably, international competitiveness and small business protec-
tion should guide enforcement in developing countries. Nonetheless, they 
are considered outdated goals, as they only lead to higher prices for con-
sumers and evidence has shown that lack of domestic competition is 
bound to create sluggishness and lack of productivity.303 This is particu-
larly true for many developing countries that have pursued years of pro-
tection and are today very far away from the global technology frontier. 
Evidence from Korea and Japan has shown that curbing local competi-
tion might only be successful when international targets are set for the 
domestic firms; otherwise protection is not merited.304 Unless a govern-
ment exercises such a similarly tight grip on its domestic firms, the Japa-
nese and Korean experiment cannot be repeated. 
The world today is different. Developing countries can no longer 
exercise the same protection Japan and Korea afforded in the 1950s and 
1960s. Yet, this does not mean that developing countries need to accept 
mainstream neoliberal economic theory either. They do have a choice to 
make. They can choose to grow using workable growth models, namely 
those that put innovation at the center of their equilibrium theories. They 
can pursue growth in heterodox manners, through promoting concentra-
tion, if evidence shows monopolistic structures to be more innovation-
encouraging. What is crucial, however, is that developing countries pur-
sue growth as the objective of their antitrust policy. By pursuing growth, 
they can tackle one of their most important concerns: technological ad-
vancement. Also, promoting innovation will, in the long run, “keep pric-
es low for consumers, . . . generate rising wages[,] and create many other 
national benefits such as technological spillovers.”305 
Redistribution should be a part of developing countries’ competi-
tion policy. This means that consumers should not suffer more under ele-
vated price levels. On the contrary, once innovation becomes the central 
driving force of antitrust policy, prices are bound to decrease over the 
long run when cost functions are reduced. Figure A.2 shows that when 
the monopolist invests his monopoly rents in lowering the marginal cost 
curve to MC2, the price is reduced to Pm2  (which is lower than under per-
fect competition at Pc) and the quantity is increased to Qm2 (which is 
higher than under perfect competition at Qc). However, it is important to 
note that had the monopolist only reduced the cost to MC1 and not to 
                                                
 303. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 143 (“Rivalry has a 
direct role in stimulating improvement and innovation.”); id. at 144 (“A group of domestic rivals 
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 304. See Amsden & Singh, supra note 7. 
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MC2, price would have still been higher and quantity lower than under 
perfect competition (Pm1 > Pc; Qm1 < Qc). This graph shows that a firm 
enjoying a monopolist position may be able to transform its cost reduc-
tion to lower prices and higher output, which is to the benefit of consum-
ers. This position is, according to the graph, only reachable when the cost 
functions are lowered sufficiently, which is often only possible when 
monopoly rents are invested in R&D and innovation. 
It is important to note that until the monopolist or dominant firm 
that is encouraged to innovate manages to lower its cost functions that 
result in lower prices, consumers should still not suffer in the interim. 
They can be awarded interest-stakes in these firms equivalent to their 
purchases or direct cash-backs or coupons awarded when they buy the 
respective products.306 This immediate redistribution aims at guarantee-
ing that the overall policy orientation of promoting innovation and 
growth does not harm consumers in the short and long run. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Antitrust laws are considered tools to achieve not only economic, 
but also social, ends. The flexibility of these laws has awarded them a 
special status, where they have been used to achieve a variety of goals 
for more than a century. The lack of a consensus as to what goal they are 
intended to achieve has allowed them to morph over time to account for 
changing surrounding circumstances. 
Developing countries’ recent encounter with antitrust laws gives 
them a fresh choice regarding what to aim at achieving with the imple-
mentation of these laws. They can look to the arsenal of choices made by 
advanced countries that preceded them for inspiration. In this paper, I 
indicate that developing countries select a range of antitrust goals that are 
often in conflict to guide their enforcement. Developing countries also 
pursue goals that are considered outdated to more advanced countries, 
such as promoting international competitiveness, increasing employment, 
encouraging entrepreneurship, and diffusing ownership. 
One goal—selected by a fifth of the fifty studied developing coun-
tries—is promoting growth and development. This goal aligns with calls 
by Alice Amsden, Ajit Singh, Michael Porter, and Joseph Brodley to use 
antitrust as a tool for growth. Promoting growth through a dynamic effi-
ciency objective for antitrust enforcement, especially one coupled with 
redistribution through antitrust rules, is a radical policy shift from the 
current static goals that most developed countries’ and many developing 
countries’ antitrust laws promote. As Gilbert and Sunshine point out, 
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One of the more fundamental criticisms leveled at antitrust en-
forcement is its traditionally static orientation. Focusing most of its 
energy towards ensuring productive and allocative efficiency, it has 
often neglected dynamic efficiency. In a world of rapid technologi-
cal advance, it is important that antitrust law pay greater attention to 
innovation issues.307 
New growth theory has made a significant contribution to the neo-
classical growth models, namely treating innovation and technological 
change as an endogenous economic phenomenon. These endogenous 
growth theories have come to conclude that innovation is a central accel-
erator of growth. Given this knowledge, antitrust laws that aim at pro-
moting growth and development should encourage innovation and tech-
nological change. 
Deciding which market structure is responsible for encouraging in-
novation, and thus growth, is a complex task. Research, both empirical 
and theoretical, has presented conflicting results.308 Some argue that 
competition is the environment most encouraging of innovation and 
growth, while others have argued that market power and monopolies are 
considered responsible for more R&D investments, innovation, and thus 
growth. 
This lack of agreement as to how to achieve growth through inno-
vation makes promoting this goal as a competition policy rather tricky. 
Would a country that is persuaded to adopt this goal as an antitrust objec-
tive adopt a policy that is tailored towards the ideal of perfect competi-
tion? Or, would it adopt a policy that is more favorable towards higher 
degrees of concentration? Or a mix of both? 
These are extremely important questions to set a priori before dy-
namic efficiency can indeed guide antitrust enforcement in developing 
countries. An extension of this research is to study which of these two 
market structures, or a mix of both, is responsible for higher growth lev-
els. Once conclusive evidence is available, particularly as it pertains to 
developing countries, the resulting market structure can be considered a 
guiding ideal. 
For decades, perfect competition has been considered the ideal 
market structure in neoliberal policies communicated to the developing 
world thorough global institutions such as the World Bank, the OECD, 
the development banks, and the IMF. Many have argued that attempts at 
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questioning the optimality of maximum competition for investment and 
technical progress by economists such as Schumpeter and Richardson 
have been relatively ignored.309 
Assessing the market structure responsible for more innovation and 
higher growth levels will aid in formulating a complete antitrust policy 
that realizes dynamic efficiencies, which many consider a more suitable 
guiding goal for antitrust enforcement. However, no countries have for-
mulated a comprehensive policy with dynamic efficiency or technologi-
cal progress at the center. 
It is, therefore, imperative to assess the market structure responsible 
for innovation in developing countries to focus antitrust enforcement to-
ward the goal of promoting dynamic efficiency, growth, and redistribu-
tion. These are the goals that this paper advocates are more suitable for 
the development needs of the Global South. 
                                                
 309. Amsden & Singh, supra note 7, at 942 (“As Telser (1987) notes: ‘It is hard for many 
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APPENDIX 
 
FIGURE A.1. PERFECT COMPETITION VS. MONOPOLY (MARKET POWER) 
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FIGURE A.2. MONOPOLIST’S COST EFFICIENCIES 
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FIGURE A.3. CONSUMER AND PRODUCER SURPLUS 
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FIGURE A.4. WILLIAMSON TRADEOFF MODEL 
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Albania 1995   x           
Argentina 1980   x   x        
Armenia 2000 x  x     x      
Barbados 2002   x x   x       
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 2001   x           
Brazil 1994 x  x           
Bulgaria 1998   x           
Chile 1973   x           
Colombia 1992 x  x  x  x       
Costa Rica 1994 x  x x x         
Croatia 1995   x           
Czech 
Republic 1991              
Egypt 2005   x x          
El Salvador 2006 x  x  x         
Estonia 1993   x           
Honduras 2005 x  x  x         
Hungary 1996 x x x  x   x x     
India 2003 x  x     x     freedom of trade 
Indonesia 1999  x x  x  x x x     
Jamaica 1993              
Jordan 2004              






Latvia 1998  x x           
Lithuania 1999   x          harmonization with EU 
Macedonia 2006 x  x  x         
Mauritius 2003              
Mexico 1992   x x x         
Mongolia 1993   x           








































































































































Albania 1995   x           
Argentina 1980   x   x        
Armenia 2000 x  x     x      
Barbados 2002   x x   x       
Montenegro 2005   x           














Pakistan 1970 x  x  x         
Panama 1996 x  x  x         
Papua New 
Guinea 2002 x x x  x      x   
Peru 1991 x x x x          




Poland 1990 x x x           
Romania 1996 x  x           





Serbia 2005 x x x  x   x      
Slovakia 1994 x  x x    x      










Sri Lanka 1987 x  x           
Syrian Arab 
Republic 2007   x x          
Tunisia 1991   x x  x       price transparency 








































































































































Albania 1995   x           
Argentina 1980   x   x        
Armenia 2000 x  x     x      
Barbados 2002   x x   x       
Turkey 1994   x           
Ukraine 1993   x x    x      










Zambia 1994 x  x x x        
free trade, 
expand base of 
entrepreneurs 
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TABLE A.2. OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS IDENTIFIED IN 




























































































































































































Australia xc x x  x   x   
Brazil xa x x x       
Bulgaria xa x  x  x     
Canada xb x x  x  x   x 
Chile xa          
Czech  
Republic x
a   x       
European Union xb x x     x   
France xa x x x  x     
Germany xa x x x x      
Hungary xb x x        
Ireland xb x     x    
Israel xa x  x       
Italy xb x  x       
Jamaica xc x x   x x    
Japan xa x    x     
Jersey xb x x x       
Korea xb x  x x x     
Latvia xb x     x    
Mexico xa x x x       
Netherlands xb x         
New Zealand xb x x     x x  
Pakistan  x x x       
Romania xb x         
Russia xa x x x    x x  
Singapore xc  x        
Slovak Republic xb x         
South Africa xb x x  x x x   x 
Sweden xb x         
Switzerland xa x x x x      
Turkey xa x x  x      
                                                
 310. ICN Report 2007, supra note 32 (33 agencies answered this part of the ICN Survey). 
1006 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:945 
Ukraine xa x x        
United Kingdom xc x x        
United States  xb x x        
Total  32 30 20 13 7 6 5 4 2 2 
a. 13 agencies cite ensuring an effective competitive process as a goal. 
b. 15 agencies cite ensuring effective competitive process as both a goal and a means. 





FIGURE A.5. ANTITRUST POLICY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
